January 1970

EDITORIAL REPRINT from L. P. JACKS

The World Is One:
Politics and an Alternative

ALEXANDER F. SKUTCH

Asceticism: An Appraisal

S. SUBHASH CHANDRA

Henri Bergson's Approach to Freedom

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What *Dharma* Means in Buddhism

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"Virtue's and Learning's Spotless Star" — Hypatia

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Ghalib: The Restless Soul

BOOKS REVIEWED INCLUDE

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THE ARYAN PATH

VOLUME XLI - NO. 1

Point out the 'Way'
however dimly and lost among the host —
as does the Evening Star
to those who tread their path in darkness.

Editor:
SOPHIA WADIA

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PUBLISHERS: Theosophy Company (India) Private Ltd.
Theosophy Hall, 40 New Marine Lines, Bombay 20.BR

THE ARYAN PATH

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CONTRIBUTIONS

The Editor is responsible for unsigned contributions only and is not necessarily in agreement with the views of the contributors, to whom free expression of opinion is given

SUBSCRIPTIONS

THE ARYAN PATH is published every month except June and July. Subscriptions are accepted for calendar years or periods covering ten issues. Orders, accompanied by the appropriate remittance, should be sent to the Editorial and Business Office, Bombay, or the London Office

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Subscribers in India may borrow, from the "Aryan Path" section of the United Lodge of Theosophists Library, Bombay, books reviewed in THE ARYAN PATH, paying only registered book-post charges if books are required by post

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	Single Copy	Annual Subscription
INDIA	Re. 1.50	Rs. 12.00
EUROPE	2*s.*	18*s.* (or equivalent)
THE AMERICAS	60 cents	$5.00 (or equivalent)

OFFICES

EDITORIAL & BUSINESS OFFICE	Theosophy Hall, 40 New Marine Lines Bombay 20 (BR)
LONDON OFFICE	62 Queen's Gardens, London w.2

Available in the U.S.A. from
Eastern News Distributors
155 West 15th Street, New York, N.Y. 10011, U.S.A.

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THE ARYAN PATH

Point out the "Way" — however dimly, and
lost among the host — as does the evening star
to those who tread their path in darkness.

— *The Voice of the Silence*

VOL. XLI JANUARY 1970 No. 1

L. P. JACKS

The World Is One

Politics and an Alternative

[We are glad to reprint this article from THE ARYAN PATH, May 1936. The author and the significance of his essay were well described in the introductory note at its first appearance:

"Dr. L. P. Jacks, Editor of *The Hibbert Journal* and author of numerous important volumes, is a practical mystic and a patient idealist. In this instructive essay he points to a remedy for the ills with which humanity is cursed. Undaunted by the magnitude of the task, he sees the possibility of the emancipation of our civilization through a new orientation of politics and propaganda, that is, through direct action on the mass mind, fully recognizing that only individuals, one by one, will achieve enlightenment. This is not the doctrine of each man for himself and the devil take the hindmost, but of each in the interest and for the benefit of all. There are various movements instinct with grand possibilities which are dedicated to this very ideal and task. One such is the Unitarian Movement with which our esteemed contributor is connected; his influence reaches far through his quarterly, *The Hibbert Journal.* THE ARYAN PATH represents a similar effort but its programme and policy touch more than a single religion ...

The world needs right knowledge in order to effect the necessary change in point of view, or attitude to life; it also needs the will to apply that knowledge so that right habits can be established. This dual task of which Dr. Jacks speaks is no doubt difficult but it is not beyond a sufficiently large number of individuals who, in emancipating themselves, can become the builders of a civilization such as Asoka created in India three centuries before the Christian Era or such as produced 'the glory that was Greece, and the grandeur that was Rome.' It is in that hope of a realization of human Brotherhood *in actu* that the Idealists of the world are labouring." —ED.]

I UNDERSTAND that the object of the series, of which the present article is one, is to shew that the Law of Universal Brotherhood functions in every department of life; that the remedy for human ills is to take the universal point of view; that every nation and every class of workers must learn to think in terms of the whole world and not of its own individual interests. In the truth and necessity of all this I believe with my whole heart. But I do not believe that it will ever be brought to pass merely by proving its necessity, not even if the proof were supported, as it could be, by unanswerable arguments, by the full force of human eloquence, and broadcast every day from every wireless station in the world. My reason for thinking so is that the proof was twice convincingly given when Buddhism and Christianity were born into the world; that it has been repeated all down the ages by saints, sages, prophets, and philosophers; but has never been acted upon even by the nations which professed to believe it, but only by individuals here and there who were not numerous enough to influence the general course of the world's affairs. If proving these things to be true and necessary could save the world I think the world would have been saved long ago. I doubt therefore whether giving the proof once more will make much difference.

What is obviously required, if peace, order, and human brotherhood are to be established, is a radical change of heart and mind, in other words, a radical change in human character, extending to all nations and not merely operating in isolated patches here and there. It may be simply defined as the change from selfishness to unselfishness. But here again it is not enough to change the *point of view* from the one to the other. The change must permeate the character of both individuals and groups and nations, and must extend consistently to the whole body of their *habits,* to their way of life. Above all else it must be a change that will *last* and stand the strains and pressures it will have to endure; not adopted in a moment of enthusiasm, or of terror (like the devil's resolution to become a monk)[1] and abandoned when the first excitement has passed, but a transformation of character so thorough that when once adopted there will be no going back. Let us be under no illusion as to the magnitude of the demand when we call for a general change-over of human character, in nations as well as individuals, from the selfish to the unselfish way of life. We are indulging an illusion when we think of it only as a change in the point of view. There must be a change in the point of view, of course; but that will amount to very little unless there is a change of *habit* as well.

---

[1] "The Devil was sick,—the Devil a monk would be
The Devil was well,—the devil a monk was he."

Habits are much more difficult to change than points of view. If you would change a man's habits you must do something more than convince him by argument that his present habits are wrong. You must patiently train him in a new habit which gradually undermines the power of the old. The force of habit — and remember that we are all creatures of habit — is always more than a match for the force of argument, and doubly so when we are dealing with the habits of nations or groups; for these are far more obstinately selfish than the habits of individuals. We see an example of that at the present time. The arguments against war-making, which is nothing else than a stupid habit of selfish nations, are irresistible, overwhelming, convincing, and known to be so by every reasonable man. And yet, like inveterate gamblers or drunkards who know they are on the road to ruin but cannot stop themselves, the nations persist in courses — arming themselves to the teeth and blocking each other's trade in every conceivable way — which threaten to involve the world in a war that will destroy civilization. Against selfish habits so deeply intrenched as those which now govern the foreign policy of nations the voice of reason sounds in vain. As well might one try to sink a battleship by bombarding it with a peashooter. Change the point of view indeed! Yes; but something more than the point of view will have to be changed if this madness is to be cured.

In my experience I have never known the case of a person who changed his mind — changed it radically — merely because some wise or good man had convinced him by argument that the change was necessary or that he would come to grief — even to the extent of going to hell — if he failed to make the change. Certainly I have never done so myself. I have known people change their minds about small things or about particular courses of action when somebody else pointed out to them the folly of what they were proposing or the superior wisdom of doing something else. Such things are common enough. But changing *oneself,* changing radically and permanently from a habitually selfish to an habitually unselfish human being — I have never known of man or woman who did that merely in response to an argument; no, not even when he admitted that the argument was unanswerable. And the reason for that is perfectly plain. When you are told that you ought to change your selfish self, your "present heart and mind," into a new and unselfish one, you find, on making the trial, *that you have only your selfish self to do it with.* And your selfish self, just because it is selfish, can't do it. You are in a vicious circle, like St. Paul in the Seventh Chapter of *Romans,* or the pagan who said, "*video meliora proboque, deteriora sequor.*"

Under these difficult circumstances how are we to set about the tre-

mendous task of persuading the nations of the world to change their selfish habits, which are now threatening the world with ruin, for the unselfish habits on which alone a universal brotherhood can be established? I am not sure that I can offer a satisfactory answer to the question and am half inclined to say with Hamlet:

> The time is out of joint: O, cursed spite,
> That ever I was born to set it right!

But we must never despair.

It seems obvious that the change of heart and mind needed to establish universal brotherhood on the earth can only come about through the moral regeneration of all nations, and, indeed, of all men. There are some who believe that this change can only be effected by the Power of God, that is, by a mighty force of Divine energy, grace, or inspiration breathed from on high into human life. This aspect of the matter I can hardly be expected to discuss in the present article. Short of such divine intervention it seems to me that the moral regeneration in question can be brought about in no other way than *by steady, patient, and long-continued effort to improve the quality of the human material, of the men and women, who form the living substance of society.*

As things now are, the quality of the human material all over the world is inadequate to support or to realize the moral ideals we believe in and strive for — inadequate not only morally and mentally but physically as well; for, in my opinion, the three things go together. The fact needs to be squarely faced, unpleasant as it may be to the idealist, that except for rare individuals here and there, men in their masses are quite incapable of playing the part of brothers in a community so vast as the Brotherhood of Mankind — incapable mentally, morally, and physically. They have neither the intellectual range, the moral steadiness, nor the physical self-control that would be needed for life on so exalted a plane. Such capacities for brotherhood as they have are limited to a narrow range, and operate imperfectly even within the groups to which they are confined. To expect them, in the present condition of the human material, to live on so high a plane, the plane of universal brotherhood, is to ask the vast majority of them to live in a way which is utterly beyond their powers. Nor are they to be blamed for their inability to respond to these lofty appeals, any more than a child having just learned his multiplication table is to be blamed for inability to cope with the higher mathematics, or a person who is ignorant of the musical scale for inability to play the piano like Paderewski. I would even say it is inhuman and unkind to propose a burden so heavy for shoulders so weak. It shows that we do not understand our fellow men and are lacking in compassion for their

weakness. It shows further, perhaps, that we do not even understand *ourselves*. For how many of us who proclaim the ideal of universal brotherhood and believe in it (as I do) as the final destiny of mankind are capable, *here and now*, of playing the part of the universal brother? I, alas, am not.

In our efforts to reform the world we have trusted far too exclusively to two agencies which neither singly nor together are adequate for the work of human reformation. These are propaganda and politics — propaganda, the process of *telling* people how they ought to live and act, without considering their *ability to respond*; politics, the process of arranging the world in *patterns* without asking ourselves how long the pattern is likely to *last*. I am not going to say that either propaganda or politics are unnecessary — certainly not propaganda, for am I not propagating something in this very article? Both are needed, but secondary in the great task of human reformation. The primary need is what I have said — effort to improve the quality of the human material, which effort, though it involves both propaganda and politics at certain stages, is, primarily, and essentially, a work of education, of long, assiduous, and patient *training*. Hitherto, in our blind faith in propaganda and politics (it seems to me blind or very nearly so) we idealists have been like architects obsessed with the beauty and stateliness of the palace we were building, but inattentive to the quality of the bricks, the stones, the mortar, and the timber which compose the edifice and by which it must be supported and sustained. What wonder that so many of our plans miscarry and so many of our constructions come to grief?

For these reasons what seems to me most needed, on a general view of our present condition, is a considerable diversion of reforming effort from the propagandist and political channels in which it now mainly runs — a considerable diversion of it from those channels and a concentration of it on improving the quality of the human material to which the politician works — in other words, *concentration on the re-education of the human race*. Short of this, the propagandist will find that he is only adding to the enormous accumulations of undigested knowledge with which the world is already well-nigh suffocated, or at least surfeited, while the politician will find that his social systems begin to crumble almost as soon as he has set them on foot. Were this problem of human re-education resolutely taken in hand with the energy and intelligence now expended on these secondary operations, I should dismiss my anxieties for the future of the human race and could almost be content to leave all else on the lap of the gods. With the quality of the human material definitely started on the upgrade, even the future of religion would give

me no concern at all. I should consider its future assured, though wholly incapable of predicting what form it would take, except that it would take the form which God and nature have ordained for it. The same with peace. With the human quality on the downgrade, or even stationary at its present stage of development, my hopes for the peace of the world would be nil. I should then look forward to a future of recurrent war, all peace pacts notwithstanding, with total disaster as the final issue. The same with the arts, the sciences, and whatever else gives value to human life. With human quality on the downgrade, or even in a stationary condition, I despair of them all, and see nothing in store for humanity but an ignominious end. Under the contrary conditions I should be full of hope. The hidden resources of humanity, waiting for the moment when we shall find it worth while to bring them to light, are inexhaustible. Of all the "undeveloped assets" now awaiting development on this troubled planet, with its imperfectly humanized population, Man himself is unquestionably the most precious. Had I the raising of a "prosperity loan" I would raise it for *that,* and not for the objects which attract Mr. Roosevelt or Mr. Lloyd George.

L. P. JACKS

The Place of the Creative Act

Who is it that I meet
In the place where truth is given me?

The truth I have not earned;
Truth I have not held until this day;
A truth which is not proved
But promising as spring's burgeoning?

It is he whose touch enthralls
The spirit eager to learn
The most difficult truth.

It is he whose song enchants
The soul and calls it home.
He is no stranger to us,
Though few call him by his name.

MARY CARMAN ROSE

ALEXANDER F. SKUTCH

Asceticism: An Appraisal

[We are very glad to have this characteristically thoughtful, lucid, and direct essay from our old and esteemed friend Dr. Alexander F. Skutch. Dr. Skutch's areas of studies have been wide, e.g., education, natural science, and biography, and they have all led him to a philosophy which is idealistic in conclusions but has its roots very firmly in a vivid appreciation of the processes of actual life, both natural and social.

In this article he puts forward a very clear and cogent analysis of the place and nature of true asceticism in all real human progress.—ED.]

RELIGION is, historically, man's attempt to attain prosperity, harmony, and enduring happiness by enlisting the support of supernatural powers. From another point of view, it is a revolt against the harshness and strife of the natural world, with all its violence and bloodshed, disease and death, with all the privations and suffering that it frequently imposes upon man and other living things.

Some of the ills that afflict us are wholly beyond our control. Against earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, hurricanes, drought, floods, excessive heat and cold, primitive man is powerless and even modern technology avails little. We must either accept them as inevitable or supplicate some higher power to shield us from them. Magic, prayer, and sacrifices to the gods have ever been man's pathetic shifts to avert the destructive power of nature. But there are other natural evils in which we are more intimately involved, and which we can take more effective measures to diminish, at least in so far as they touch our lives. The greatest and most widespread of these evils is predation, the slaughter and devouring of one animal by another, which is, directly or indirectly, the cause of most of the terror, violence, and carnage that afflict the world of animals, as well as some of the ugliest passions that oppress mankind.

The second of these evils is sexuality as developed in man. Admirably integrated into the whole pattern of life of many a non-human animal, sexuality in man has grown like a rank and noxious weed. When one considers all the struggles, too often ineffectual, that responsible people undergo to control it in themselves; all the shame and agony it causes when it escapes from moral control and results in disrupted marriages, unwanted pregnancies, and illegitimate births; all the social and economic ills, all the wars and famines, all the destruction of natural beauty, caused by overpopulation, which in turn springs from man's too-strong sexual impulses; all the crudities of its physiological manifestations; all the ugliness, lewdness, and obscenity that it prompts — when one con-

siders these manifold ills for which sexuality is responsible, one must concede that its over-development is one of mankind's greatest afflictions.

Human sexuality is a standing insult to human rationality. To be denied full rational and voluntary control of one of the most important things he does — the begetting of offspring — is one of the most distressing of man's limitations. Contemplating this violent opposition between human rationality and human sexuality, one finds it difficult to believe that man was conceived or created by a deity at once omnipotent and benevolent.

It was inevitable that these two outstanding evils — predation throughout the animal kingdom and sexuality as overdeveloped in man — should be prime targets of the religious revolt against nature. It was also logical that the methods taken to combat them should differ from those employed against natural catastrophes such as drought and famine, flood and earthquake. To avert the latter, men could do nothing more effective than to sacrifice, pray, or resort to magic. But one can refuse to live as a predatory animal; one can resist his sexual impulses, perhaps subdue or sublimate them. If thereby he does not purge the world of its abominations, he at léast takes a firm stand, makes a stout protest, and does all that lies in his power to mitigate them.

This steadfast refusal to participate in the horror of predation and to be swayed by irrational sexual impulses constitutes the core of asceticism as practised in most religions, especially in the East. To this is usually added stern repression of the acquisitiveness, the desire for worldly possessions, that engenders so much envy, strife, contention, and bitterness in human societies. The typical ascetic eats only vegetable foods, and those in moderation; he abstains from sex or uses it sparingly for procreation; he has few possessions, and those the most indispensable.

When we view religion as a protest or revolt against the evils of nature, which undeniably it is, then it becomes apparent that asceticism is the most effective part of religion — one might almost say, the only effective part. There is no sound evidence that sacrifices or supplications have ever coaxed a drop of rain from the sky, or throttled a volcanic eruption, or abated the hurricane's fury, or made the flood recede, or halted a plague, or stopped a war, or cured any bodily malady that did not have its root in psychic disturbances. There is no evidence, able to withstand scientific scrutiny, that any religion has ever conquered that universal affliction of the living world, death, and brought a blessed immortality to its faithful. But it is undeniable that the ascetic, by firm adherence to his vows, diminishes some of nature's evils: no animal is killed to supply his meals, no wild creature is terrorized to provide him

sport; no maiden is seduced, no bastard born to ignominy, no marriage disrupted, because of his incontinence. Moreover, no ugly disputes over property arise from his acquisitiveness, nobody has too little because he has too much. Since the fraction of the world's ills that can be attributed to any one man is infinitesimal, the most steadfast ascetic can correct only an infinitesimal fraction of those ills; yet by providing a standing example of a controlled life and constantly holding aloft the standard of revolt against some of the worst of nature's evils, his influence may extend far beyond his personal activities.

Since the ascetic's practices constitute the most demonstrably effective revolt against nature's evils, the religion that fails to encourage a measure of asceticism is an incomplete or defective religion. Something essential to religion has been omitted from it. It has neglected that most important element in nearly all early religions, man's relation to the natural world of which he is a part, to concentrate on man's relation to man, and, above all, the winning of heaven. But it does not even improve human relations as well as it might do by means of a wider vision and a more inclusive revolt against the crudities of man's nature. By neglecting to repress man's predatory impulses, as exhibited in the slaughterhouse and such bloody "sports" as hunting and bull-fighting, by doing little or nothing to restrain sexuality and acquisitiveness, such a religion leaves human nature in a crude state, and human relations suffer from this crudity. In so far as the winning of a blessed immortality depends upon character and conduct, these non-ascetic religions do less than they should to prepare their adherents for heaven. Too often the members of those faiths cherish the hope that after a life of scarcely restrained indulgence in the flesh-pots of this earth they may enter a paradise that is hardly less grossly sensual.

The ascetic element is notably deficient in some of the widespread forms of the three major religions whose sources may be traced to the Old Testament: Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. These religions are not without their fasts, partial or complete, their abstentions and mild austerities, but these are practised principally to commemorate certain events peculiar to each religion, such as the flight from Egypt or Christ's Passion, or else for ritual ends: they are not directed against primary natural evils; they do nothing to heighten awareness of them or to mitigate them, as do the ascetic practices of such Eastern religions as Jainism and Buddhism. For Judaism, especially, a revolt against the evil of predation would have been appropriate. Among the most inspiring and influential passages in the Old Testament are those in Isaiah foretelling the advent of the Messiah, when the strife of nature will cease, animal

cease to kill and devour animal, and peace and love prevail over all the earth. Since Judaism has, apparently, never ceased to cherish this hope, one might suppose that, to prepare for the arrival of this blessed day, the Jews would have become vegetarians as strict as the Jains. But they do nothing of the sort, while they passively await the establishment of universal peace through supernatural agency unseconded by human effort.

Only an ascetic religion can satisfy one who feels the full horror of nature's crudities and is determined to take a firm stand against them and do what little he can to mitigate them. Yet asceticism is too often overdone. The good citizen who struggles against some of the evils or injustices of his country does not wish to abandon or destroy it, but only to improve it. Similarly, one who revolts against the evil in nature should not repudiate nature wholly, or refuse to recognize and enjoy all the good it contains. For nature is neither wholly evil nor wholly good, but a mixture of the two; just as human nature, which is part of the universal nature, is a mixture of good and evil. And the good in nature, as I have long contended,[1] is primary, whereas the evil is secondary, the result of the clashes that arise in consequence of the excessive intensity of the movement to build the crude stuff of the Universe into coherent, harmonious patterns, that is, to increase goodness. So intense is this striving for organization that it initiates more patterns than can find the space and materials that they need to complete themselves; becoming overcrowded, organized beings collide and often destroy each other. Universal evolution is directed toward the increase of beauty, joy, and love; ugliness, suffering, and hatred are its tragic by-products.

Asceticism is an expression of the religious revolt against the evils of nature. If it avoids fanatic extremes, it will confine its rebellion to what is truly evil and not reject the whole of nature. The rational ascetic, who keeps clearly in mind the reasons for his practices, should not hesitate to enjoy and participate in all that is good, beautiful, and innocent in the natural world, as well as in human society. By studying nature, contemplating and perhaps even creating beauty, cultivating friendships, and similar wholesome activities, he will expand his mind and elevate his spirit, thereby making it worthy of the blessed immortality to which he aspires, if that be the goal of his religious practices rather than just to live decently and blamelessly on this earth. Asceticism, a protest against the world's agonies, should not increase sorrow but joy. The most admirable ascetic is he who, avoiding all narrowness, can show us how to live fully and joyously without harming any creature.

Although ascetic doctrines and practices are fully developed only in

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[1] Especially in *The Quest of the Divine* (Boston. 1956).

the so-called higher religions, the germs of asceticism can be found in primitive races. Widespread in early societies was the belief that for success in the hunt, on a raiding expedition, or some other important enterprise, the participants, and sometimes even members of their clans who remained at home, must fast, or abstain from certain foods, and practise continence. Likewise there was the quest for visions by means of fasts, austerities, sometimes even mutilations. Although the objectives of some of the enterprises for which these primitive people practised austerities — such as success in the chase or in a foray — may to us appear to be of a low order, to the tribesman they were often all-important, for survival depends upon them. Might we not say that already, at an early stage of human culture, there was a vague feeling that for the highest accomplishments some denial of natural appetite, some rebellion against nature, was necessary? As, with advancing culture, our objectives have become higher and more spiritual, we have developed and formalized what was true in this early insight, thereby giving rise to asceticism as an essential part of religion.

ALEXANDER F. SKUTCH

He is confirmed in spiritual knowledge when he forsaketh every desire which entereth into his heart, and of himself is happy and content in the Self through the Self. His mind is undisturbed in adversity; he is a stranger to anxiety, fear, and anger. Such a man is called a Muni. When in every condition he receives each event, whether favourable or unfavourable, with an equal mind which neither likes nor dislikes, his wisdom is established, and, having met good or evil, neither rejoiceth at the one nor is cast down by the other. He is confirmed in spiritual knowledge, when, like the tortoise, he can draw in all his senses and restrain them from their wonted purposes. The hungry man loseth sight of every other object but the gratification of his appetite, and when he is become acquainted with the Supreme, he loseth all taste for objects of whatever kind. The tumultuous senses and organs hurry away by force the heart even of the wise man who striveth after perfection. Let a man, restraining all these, remain in devotion at rest in me, his true self; for he who hath his senses and organs in control possesses spiritual knowledge.

He who attendeth to the inclinations of the senses, in them hath a concern; from this concern is created passion, from passion anger, from anger is produced delusion, from delusion a loss of the memory, from the loss of memory loss of discrimination, and from loss of discrimination loss of all! But he who, free from attachment or repulsion for objects, experienceth them through the senses and organs, with his heart obedient to his will, attains to tranquillity of thought. —*The Bhagavad-Gita*

S. SUBHASH CHANDRA

Henri Bergson's Approach to Freedom

[Dr. S. Subhash Chandra, M.A. (Osmania), D.PHIL (Cologne), is known to our readers by his scholarly studies of Martin Heidegger and other philosophers in THE ARYAN PATH. In this well-documented article he brings out the place of freedom — a rather neglected aspect — in the philosophy of Henri Bergson. His explanation of the nature of time and duration in relation to human freedom is of importance.—ED.]

HENRI BERGSON (1859–1941) was unquestionably the most influential French thinker of the first half of the present century. Bergson is generally known as the philosopher of pure duration and creative evolution. It appears that one is hardly any more aware of the fact that Bergsonian thought owes its existence to an enquiry into the problem of freedom, that the investigations into the nature of time were themselves a means to a due understanding of the nature of freedom.[1] Thus, *Essai sur les données immédiates de la conscience,* the doctoral thesis published by the thirty-year-old Bergson, was avowedly written to clarify the problem of freedom. We propose, therefore, by a due appraisal of the Bergsonian notion of freedom, to rectify in the present article the widely prevailing one-sided identification of Bergson's philosophy with duration and evolution.

It is difficult to ascertain the sources of Bergson's theory of freedom. The footnote references to John Stuart Mill seem to testify to a possible influence exercised by him over the thoughts of young Bergson. However, it was an influence felt more in the dissent that it provoked than in the concurrence of views. Herbert Spencer is in a paradoxical manner the father of the Bergsonian philosophy: it was in revolt against the mechanistic view of things canvassed by Spencer that Bergson became a philosopher in his own right. Bergson could not accept the Spencerian philosophy; for it interprets time in terms of space. Since Bergson's theory of freedom, as we shall see in the sequel, is embedded in the distinction between pure duration and spatialized time, Spencer too may be said to

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[1] It may be stated that many distinguished Bergsonians see in the problem of freedom a "wrong beginning" of the enquiries of their master. Thus, Henri Gouhier in his *Bergson et le Christ des évangiles* (Arthème Fayard, Paris. 1961), p. 20, espouses the viewpoint that the exploration of the phenomenon of freedom represents only " an intermediate stage " and that Bergsonism is a philosophy of nature *par excellence*. Albert Thibaudet, who had the privilege of being a personal friend of the philosopher, on the other hand, maintains: " Bergsonism, issuing from a thesis on freedom, appears to us to be a speculation on freedom right to the end. " See his *Trente ans de vie française : Le Bergsonisme* (Editions de la nouvelle Revue française, Paris. 1923), Vol. III' Part II, p. 9.

have indirectly contributed to the approach of his younger French contemporary to this problem. There is nothing in the writings of Bergson that would justify tracing his thoughts on freedom back to Schopenhauer, though many scholars, including a Bergsonian like Jankélévitch,[2] are impressed by the affinities between the German pessimist and the French optimist. In short, it is doubtful whether one can cite any particular thinker who could be said to have directly influenced Bergson's understanding of freedom. It would be more correct to see in Bergson's affirmation of freedom a reaction against the diverse forms of determinism that seem to have dominated Western thought towards the end of the nineteenth century. In other words, it was in a climate of general denial of freedom that Bergson was led to ponder over this problem. It is, however, difficult to pinpoint the climatic zones where from the influencing winds originated.[3]

The Bergsonian approach to freedom is rooted in the conviction that all preceding solutions of this problem — be they in the form of an affirmation or a denial of free will — entail a fundamental confusion between duration and space, succession and simultaneity, quality and quantity.[4] The uncompromising determinist would insist that all human action is as predetermined as the course of the planets, that it is as impossible for a human being to alter the course of his life as it would be for a planet to change its orbit. It is evident that here the advocate of determinism is envisaging the course of human life as analogous with the orbit of a planet. Now the astronomical orbits are spatial phenomena: they describe the course of heavenly bodies over certain stretches of space. To compare the progress of a human life with the rotations of a planet would, therefore, amount to interpreting it in terms of space. According to Bergson, the deterministic approach to the problem of freedom does violence to human nature: it reduces the human being to a mere thing, to an accomplished and, therefore, a static fact.

It is essential to cast off the socially useful but philosophically untenable habit of dealing with human existence as if it were a spatial entity. Bergson is fully aware of the fact that we live mostly in space rather than in duration. He avers:

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[2] VLADIMIR JANKELEVITCH: *Bergson* (Félix Alcan, Paris. 1931), pp. 102–3. Gunther Pflug in his *Henri Bergson* (Walter de Gruyter Verlag, Berlin. 1959), pp. 84–85, 309, refers to the impact of Schopenhauer on French thought.

[3] JEAN GUITTON: *La vocation de Bergson* (Gallimard, Paris. 1960), p. 208.

[4] BERGSON: *Essai sur les données immédiates de la conscience* (Presses Universitaires de France, Paris. 1965), p. 180. (This book will henceforth be referred to as "*Essai*".) Bergson returns to this point in his *La pensée et le mouvant* (Presses Universitaires de France, Paris. 1966), p. 20.

> For most of the time, we live extraneous to our own selves. We perceive only a faded phantom of our being, a shadow that the pure duration projects in the homogeneous space. Our existence unrolls itself, therefore, rather in space than in time: we live rather for the external world than for ourselves; we are rather given to talk than to think; we are rather "acted upon" than that we act ourselves.[5]

This predominance of space over duration is facilitated by the human intelligence, which is only a tool that furthers pragmatic goals. Not what is true but what is useful is apprehended by the human intelligence. Intelligence is at home in the world of shapes and forms, evokes watertight distinctions that are incapable of grasping the fluid multiplicity of the pure duration.

That intelligence forces a living phenomenon like human freedom into the strait-jacket of dead space is borne out as soon as we seek to define freedom. All rational analysis of freedom unconsciously transforms it into a dead thing: spontaneity is solidified into inertia and freedom stands reduced to necessity. It is essential to eschew the rationalistic approach and realize that human freedom, a dynamic reality as it is, is by its very nature undefinable.[6]

Freedom is no abstraction but a profoundly felt reality, something that can be directly and consciously lived by us. But it is not a commonplace reality to be found anywhere and everywhere by all and sundry. Indeed, freedom is so uniquely rare that most human beings never become acquainted with it. Most of us spend the bulk of our lives in more or less automatic responses to more or less habitual situations. Freedom is a rare experience to be attained only by a violent effort by each of us. We have to wrench ourselves free of spatialized time, liberate ourselves from the quantified simultaneities, regain our sense of inner duration and thereby feel within ourselves our own freedom.[7] In a word, it is essential to intuitively grasp freedom as a profound fact of human consciousness.

Freedom in the Bergsonian scheme of things is to be attained by a deepened awareness of our inner duration. Bergson, as is well known, was a philosopher of duration. Duration is the stuff reality is made of. Space is representative of appearance: duration incarnates reality. Space signifies quantity, inertia, social utility, mere routine, and bondage. Duration

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[5] BERGSON: *Essai*, p. 174

[6] *Ibid.*, pp 165, 173. In the words of Jean Wahl: "Freedom is a fact, a quite clear fact; but no sooner the philosopher ponders over this fact that he embroils it be it under the influence of the notion of causality or be it by the intrusion of space in time." JEAN WAHL: *Bergson* (Paris, Centre de Documentation Universitaire, 1965), p. 149

[7] BERGSON: *L'évolution créatrice* (Presses Universitaires de France, Paris. 1966), p. 201. Edouard le Roy in his *Une philosophie nouvelle, Henri Bergson* (Félix Alcan, Paris. 1922), pp. 75-76, is particularly eloquent on this aspect of the thought of his master.

connotes quality, movement, creative thrust (*élan vital*), life, consciousness, freedom. Now, if freedom be a phenomenon of duration and if duration be the reality as such, then it is evident that any deepened awareness of our own freedom would bring us to the neighbourhood of duration and thereby to reality itself. The quest for freedom embodies, therefore, no mere moral venture but is, at the same time, an ontological search. No sooner do we regain our consciousness of inner freedom (all freedom is inner freedom, i.e., it comes from within; outside us is a world determined by space, a world of automatism and bondage) than we also coincide with duration as such and are no more subservient to the spatial world. Freedom is no mere moral phenomenon: it is an integral part of duration and, therefore, of reality as such.[8]

The Bergsonian duration is a psychological phenomenon: it is a flux felt within us, a movement consciously felt by us as soon as we detach ourselves by a painful effort from the world of space and spatialized time. No wonder, then, that freedom, an integral part of duration, also becomes a psychological reality. The problem of freedom, contends Bergson, is to be entirely located in the domain of consciousness.[9] Strictly speaking, consciousness is the hall-mark of all life, However, as far as plants and animals are concerned, consciousness is dormant to varying degrees. And, as far as human consciousness is concerned, its primary role consists in the capacity of choice. To adduce Bergson:

> Consciousness corresponds exactly to the capacity of choice that the living being possesses; it is coextensive with the margin of possible action that encloses within itself the real action: consciousness is synonymous with invention and liberty.[10]

Freedom, then, is at once a phenomenon of duration and consciousness. Freedom involves conscious choice. The Bergsonian philosophy ascribes one common feature to pure duration and consciousness, viz., they are not subservient to the causality that predominates over the world of space. Physical causality requires that nothing new is created in the passage between one moment and the moment following it. Further,

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[8] Thus, in an interesting letter to Léon Brunschvicg, Bergson observes: "I cannot conceive of freedom outside of time, outside of consciousness, outside of the action perceived within time and presented to the consciousness." BERGSON: *Ecrits et paroles* (Presses Universitaires de France, Paris. 1957), Vol. I, p. 194

[9] BERGSON: *Essai*, p. 152. In his Huxley Lecture, delivered at the University of Birmingham on 29 May 1911, Bergson elucidates the opposition between freedom and necessity in terms of the opposition characteristic of consciousness and matter. He writes: "Matter is necessity; consciousness is freedom. Though they are both in conflict with one another, life finds ways and means of reconciling them with one another. Life is precisely freedom (i.e. consciousness) inserting itself in necessity (i.e. matter) and exploiting it for its own benefit." (*L'énergie spirituelle*, Presses Universitaires de France, Paris, 1964, p. 13)

[10] *L'évolution créatrice*, p. 264

physical causality deals with things, i.e., spatial entities related to one another in terms of cause and effect. In the world of psychological duration, on the other hand, we have fluid states, dynamic movements, sheer multiplicity and progress: we do not have any self-enclosed things here. As a result, the cause-and-effect relationship is non-existent within consciously felt duration. Besides, psychological duration is full of surprises, creative developments of the most unexpected sort: it is a world of unpredictability. Every instant of pure duration (if one can at all use quantitative terms like "instant" here) that melts into the succeeding instants is pregnant with unforeseeable possibilities. In the very movement between two states of consciousness new developments occur that challenge the validity of the sort of causality prevailing in the world of space.[11] Now, if freedom is a phenomenon of psychological duration and if physical causality is alien here, then it is obvious that a rigid linkage of cause and effect is irrelevant to real freedom too. The determinist is guilty of illegitimately importing a law that is perfectly valid in the domain of space into the world of pure duration. Indeed, the deterministic negation of freedom directly ensues from a misapplication of spatial causality to a fundamentally psychological phenomenon like that of human freedom.

This rejection of the validity of physical causality necessarily entails that human freedom stands unrestricted by any predictability whatsoever. There is no repetition in pure duration. The psychological states have a unique existence: they occur only once in the consciousness and never recur any more. Not the law of causality but the law of identity reigns in our consciousness. Unlike the law of causality that would link the effect to the cause and render the future dependent upon the present, the law of identity links only the present to the present and thereby accords to every "now" its uniqueness. No two states of consciousness ever resemble one another. Indeed, even the simplest psychological developments have their own personality, their own incomparable existence. Even if it may seem as if a former state of consciousness were occurring anew, such a recurrence by its very appearance at a different stage of the life of the concerned human being differs from its predecessor and has thereby an identity of its own. Every phase of our conscious existence must be directly lived as and when it occurs and cannot be either predicted or repeated.[12]

In a fascinating analysis of the question whether a hypothetical philosopher Paul, knowing all the conditions wherein another hypothetical being Peter acts, can predict the course of action of the latter, Bergson

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[11] *Essai*, pp. 147, 151–152, *Ecrits et paroles*, Vol. I, p. 195

[12] *Ibid.*, pp. 164, 156, 150, 149

has tried to show the sheer impossibility of any predictability here. There are two possibilities open to Paul: (*a*) he can know in advance like a novelist the final end of Peter and in the light of this knowledge can reconstruct the developments that may precede such an end; (*b*) he can directly live the succeeding states of consciousness of Peter and thereby become familiar with his choice of action. The first possibility cannot be cited in favour of predictability, for it presupposes that the final act is already known by Paul. Needless to say, in a genuine prediction only the antecedents must be known; the final end, precisely because it is to be predicted, must remain unknown. The second possibility, on the other hand, would necessitate that Paul be co-present with, nay become directly one with, the psychological being of Peter. In that case, of course, Paul would become identical with Peter and would live each moment of his duration: he would no more be an external spectator, who offers to foretell what Peter may do in the time to come. Hence, neither of these two possibilities can be advanced to support the thesis of predictability.[13]

As we have seen, freedom is to be located in the domain of consciousness. The Bergsonian consciousness is no one-dimensional entity, no thing lying stretched over a levelled surface. According to Bergson, there are layers of consciousness that correspond to the extent to which one has come nearer to one's inner duration and, conversely, the extent to which one has moved away from the world of space. Our conscious self (*le moi*) on the surface is subordinate to the spatial world: at this level, we only have the illusion of taking free decisions. In reality, social pressure makes sheer marionettes out of us and we merely do what others require of us. Bergson is willing to concede that at this superficial level the deterministic denial of freedom is perfectly valid. However, this conscious self on the surface does not exhaust human personality. There are deeper layers of our consciousness that are no more subservient to social pressure. All moral revolts emanate from these subterranean depths of our conscious being. Any crisis of conscience is expressive of an irresistible thrust springing from the bottom of our personality, a thrust that sweeps away the impediments that social pressure may place in our way. It may seem then as if we had acted without any rational consideration, or perhaps even against all sound judgement. We are at a loss to explain our mode of response. But, then, precisely this inexplicability is the hallmark of a genuinely free decision. For all rational explanations are but socially stereotyped accounts of responses automatically made by us. Really free decisions, on the other hand, cannot be accounted for: they are expressive of our entire being and bear the same undefinable resemblance

[13] *Ibid.*, pp. 139–42

to our being in its totality as a great work of art to its creator.

The preceding considerations lead Bergson to the inevitable corollary of freedom being no absolute phenomenon, but a conscious choice of varying degrees. Just as we have levels of consciousness that correspond to the extent to which we have become sensible of our inner duration, so too we have their counterparts in the degree of freedom. At the surface of our consciousness, there is hardly any freedom at all: we are mere puppets of socially prescribed conventions. The deeper we plunge into the layers of our consciousness, the greater also is the degree of our freedom: for now our decisions become progressively articulations of our own personality.[14]

These are the salient aspects of the Bergsonian approach to freedom. It represents a cautious acceptance of both a deterministic denial and the opposite unrestricted affirmation of human freedom. In that it admits that freedom is a rare state of our conscious self and that there are degrees of it, it extends a qualified assent to the determinists. On the other hand, by its unmistakable espousal of the reality of freedom in the depths of our conscious being, it stands on the side of the votaries of free will. In a word, it is a profound attempt to reconcile two antagonistic trends of moral philosophy.[15]

S. SUBHASH CHANDRA

Loneliness and Solitude

Solitude is full of grace
Radiant beauty on her face:
Loneliness all gaunt and drear
Gnawed with self-pity
Sheds many a tear.

Solitude is pure
As she dwells with Love;
Loneliness, unclean,
Clings to self all mean.

AUDREY S. LA ROCHE

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[14] *Ibid.*, p. 125. Ian W. Alexander elucidates this aspect of the Bergsonian thought in his *Bergson, Philosopher of Reflection* (Bowes and Bowes, London. 1957), p. 28

[15] BERGSON : *Matiére et mémoire* (Presses Universitaires de France, Paris. 1965), p. 207

R. N. KAK

What *Dharma* Means in Buddhism

[Shri R. N. Kak is well known to our readers by his several contributions on aspects of Buddhist teaching. In this brief article he examines the complex of meanings centred upon the term *Dharma* in Buddhist tradition. He has explained methodically the use of the term in different contexts in Buddhist philosophy.—ED.]

THE BUDDHISTS always refer to Buddhism as *Dharma*. The *Dharma*-theory is essentially common to all the schools of Buddhism. It seems to be the framework within which Buddhist wisdom operates. The credit for first pointing out that views on *Dharma* are shared by all schools of Buddhism goes to Stcherbatsky.[1] He also regards views on *Dharma* as a basis for advanced forms of meditation and theorizing and the starting point of most of the later developments in Buddhist philosophy. Scholars before him overlooked the significance of philosophical analysis of reality into its factors, or *dharmas* and sometimes even went so far as to regard it as later scholastic elaboration. The Buddha cannot be regarded merely as a moralist, as some of the European scholars have unfortunately done. The original doctrine of the Buddha has its philosophical content and is capable of philosophical elaboration and development.

Here, we will consider the seven philosophically most important meanings of this word *dharma*. In Sanskrit the word *dharma* is derived from the root *dhṛ*, which means "to uphold." The same root seems also to be the basis of such words as *thronos, firmus,* and *fretus*. In an ontological sense, we can say, "*Dharma* is." This meaning is capable of five interpretations.

1. *Dharma* is a transcendental reality. Here it is real in absolute truth and also in the ultimate sense.[2] "The *dharma* which is the object of supreme knowledge, or the supreme *dharma*" is *Nirvāṇa*.[3] Because *Nirvāṇa* obstructs (*vidhāraṇa*) further transmigration, it is called a *dharma*. When one takes refuge in the *Dharma*, actually he is doing so in *Nirvāṇa*.[4] In this sense *Dharma*'s position can be compared to that occupied by *Ātman* and *Brahman* in some Hindu systems of thought.

2. *Dharma* is "the order or law of the universe, immanent, eternal, uncreated."[5]

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[1] *The Central Conception of Buddhism and the Meaning of the Word "Dharma"* (1923; reprinted 1956).

[2] CANDRAKIRTI; *Prasannapadā*, XVII. 304, XXVII. 592

[3] *Abhidharmakośa*, I·4 [4] *Ibid.*, IV. 78

[5] The Pali Text Society's *Pali-English Dictionary*, 171

> Whether Tathāgatas do or do not arise (or appear), that state of things, that established order of dharma (or its enduring nature, *dhammaṭṭhitiṭā*), that fixed sequence of dharma (or its regulative principle, *dhammaniyāmatā*) is firmly established, i.e., that all compounded things (*dharmas*) are impermanent, ill, not-self.[6]

Others have also spoken about

> this true nature (*dharmatā*) of dharmas, which is firmly established whether Tathāgatas are produced or not produced, the established order of *dharmas*, the fixed sequence of *dharmas*, Suchness, Not-falseness, Unaltered Suchness, the Reality-limit.[7]

Here "the true nature of *dharmas*" refers to conditioned co-production, which operates without being affected by the appearance or non-appearance of Tathāgatas, who alone can discover it. Another example occurs in the *Dhammapada* where it is said: "Never can hatred be appeased by hatred; it will be appeased only by non-hatred. This is an everlasting *dharma*."

3. A *dharma* as "a truly real event" can be defined either (*a*) negatively or (*b*) positively. The *dharma* is taken as the objective truth and things are seen differently when *dharma* is taken as the norm.

(*a*) The dharma theory avoids three mistakes and thus differs from the so-called common-sense view. (i) Whatever event happens or process takes place, no account is taken of "persons" or "things" when viewing the event or the process. No idea of an ill-defined "self" is accorded a place as a fact in them. (ii) Facts are not taken into account according to the ideas of "belonging" and "owning." (iii) The student of *dharmas* never identifies himself with any part of the world of the senses. Avoiding these three errors, *dharmas* represent the ontological law itself. Notions of "self" do not disturb and events are seen in their own-being, as facts, actually seen.

(*b*) Positively, (i) *dharmas* "carry themselves."[8] They are not attached to or supported by any person, thing, or self. They neither own nor are owned, but are simply facts in their own right. (ii) Each *dharma* "carries" its own "mark."[9] Each *dharma* has a particular essential nature and is different from all others. For example, consciousness means the state of "being aware"; ignorance "lack of cognition"; and so on. A mark defines an event and is identical with it. (iii) They "carry" the so-called persons and things. They being ultimates, all persons and things are combinations of elemental *dharmas*. (iv) *Dharmas* come very much

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[6] *Aṅguttara Nikāya*, I.285

[7] *Pañcaviṁśatisāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā*, 188

[8] *Atthasālinī*, 39

[9] CANDRAKIRTI: *Prasannapadā*, XVII. 304, XXIII. 456; *Abhidharmakośa*, I.4

nearer to what is really there. Everyday experiences do not so come near. This is because the *dharmas* are free from all that greed, delusion, and the aggressiveness of deceptive selves insert into the presentation of experience. They are there, unfalsified by greed etc. (*Atthasālinī*: "*dharīyanti yathā sa-bhāvata*") (v) The *dharmas* are "carried" by conditions. (*Atthasālinī*: "*dhāriyanti paccayehi*; *dharma* as *hetu*, as conditioned by Law). They exist separately, but also co-operate. It is difficult to understand but *dharmas* at this point are closely related to *Dharma* in the sense given below in 6 as "moral law." Here "the rational and the ethical elements are fused into one."[10]

For a proper understanding of Buddhist philosophy it is very important to appreciate the difference between *dharmas* and the "common-sense" view of things and events. Things around us as they appear to us according to our common sense are regarded by Buddhists as false appearances. The *dharmas* are hidden from sight because of ignorance and only the virtue of wisdom can penetrate to them. The world is regarded by the Buddhist science of salvation as composed of a never-ending flow of ultimates, called *dharmas*. They are also classified as multiple, momentary, impersonal, mutually conditioned.

4. *Dharma*, sometimes, also means objective data, mental objects, or mental percepts. It is the object or support of the mind, which is considered the sixth sense-organ.

5. "Characteristic," "quality," "property," and "attribute" are also meanings of *dharma*. This meaning also refers to the use of *dharma* as an adjective (*-dharma, -dharmin*). "Doomed to fade away (*vaya-dharmā*) are all compounded things." Here *dharma* can be rendered as "subject to," "following the law of," "essentially" (*eidēs*), "destined to be," "being constituted," "having the inherent quality." On seeing a corpse, a monk exclaims: "Also this body of mine is of the same nature (*evaṃ-dhammo*), of the same kind, and it has not gone beyond this."

6. In relation to conduct in life, *Dharma* means the moral law. Duty, virtue, right behaviour, righteousness and religious practice all come within the fold of *Dharma*. *Dhārmika* means "righteous" or "pious" and *dharmeṇa* "with justice, rightly, properly." *Dharma* in this sense represents the whole religious life. It has five parts (*skandha*), namely, morality, concentration, wisdom, deliverance, and the vision and cognition of deliverance.[11] It is called the "five-limbed" *Dharma*-body and indicates (*sūcyata*) *Nirvāṇa*.[12] The term *dharmacaryā* refers to the "practice of the *Dharma*" and is supposed to be the way to *Nirvāṇa* because it

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[10] The Pali Text Society's *Pali-English Dictionary*, 171

[11] *Abhidharmakośa*, VI. 297

[12] CANDRAKIRTI : *Prasannapadā*, 48

obstructs (*vidhāraṇa*) rebirth in the states of woe.[13] The *dharmacārin* is at ease in this world as well as in the world beyond. Sometimes *Dharma* is also used to denote the Path.

7. *Dharma* also means the teaching of the Buddha and the *dharmic* facts as interpreted by the teaching. Here it means the doctrine, scriptures, truth, sacred text, or doctrinal text. Often it is referred to as "*Sad-Dharma*." The preacher of *Dharma* is the person who "opens the wisdom-eye of others, explains what is good and what is bad, and builds up the immaculate body of the *dharma*."[14]

At times it becomes very difficult to determine which one of these various meanings is intended. The Buddha's words, "those who know the discourse on *dharma* as like unto a raft should forsake *dharmas*, still more so no-*dharmas*" are interpreted differently by the Sthaviras and the Mahayanists. The Sthaviras take it in its moral and the Mahayanists in its ontological sense.[15] Many of the technical terms regarding the more advanced teaching have been handed down from antiquity and the various sects could not always agree on their meaning. Such terms are, "*Dharma*-body," "*Dharma*-eye," the "analytical knowledge of *dharma*," the "investigation (*pravicaya*) into *dharma*," "the cognition of the stability of *dharmas*" (*dharma-sthitijñāna*), and so on. When the Mahayanists identify the causally interrelated *dharmas* with the one and only *Dharma*, the distinction between *Dharma* and the *dharmas* is abandoned.

The difference in meaning and interpretation is more often a question of emphasis than of opinion. The Sthaviras usually stress the sober and matter-of-fact meaning of the word *dharma*. The Mahayanists have a tendency to give the word a more exalted religious meaning. When the Sthaviras use the term "*dharma*-ness" (*Dharmatā*), they mean something that is "normal" or "in the nature of things."[16] The Mahayana formula says: "Ah, the *Dharma*, ah, the *Dharma*, ah the *dharma*-hood of *Dharma*!"[17] The word "ah" (*aho*) expresses wonder: "ah, how wonderful, how miraculous!"[18] "*Dharma*-hood" or the true nature of *Dharma* becomes an object of religious awe.[19]

R. N. KAK

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[13] *Ibid.*, XVII. 304

[14] *Abhidharmakośa*, IV. 240

[15] CONZE: *Buddhist Wisdom Books* (1958), 34–36

[16] The Pali Text Society's *Pali-English Dictionary*, 175

[17] *Aṣṭasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā*, II.48

[18] Commentary on *Vimānavatthu*, 103: *Mahāvastu*

[19] Vajracchedika, 26b

JOAN N. BURNETT

"Virtue's and Learning's Spotless Star"—Hypatia

[Our old and esteemed friend Mrs. Joan N. Burnett has read deeply in history, philosophy, mysticism, and Theosophy. She writes with feeling and with exact documentation of Hypatia, the admirable woman-philosopher whose life has moved students to admiration and loyalty, and whose tragic end has aroused sympathy and indignation for centuries after her passing. Mrs. Burnett does not overlook what that other remarkable woman Teacher, H. P. Blavatsky, has to say about Hypatia.—ED.]

> Divine Hypatia, who doth far and near
> Virtue's and Learning's Spotless Star appear.
> —Epigram written during her lifetime

A LITTLE, A VERY LITTLE BOOK, probably one of the smallest in the British Museum Library, tells the story of a woman of whom we would gladly know more, but who, one fears, must remain lost in the mists of time. Few or none among English writers mention her, and the novel by Charles Kingsley, of which she was made the subject in the Victorian age, is largely imaginary.

The little book in question in "*HYPATIA: or, the History of a Lady who was torn to Pieces by the Clergy of Alexandria to gratify the Pride, Emulation and Cruelty of St. Cyril.* By JOHN TOLAND. London. 1753." Only thirty-six pages long, in old-fashioned type and marbled cover, it expands its title on a fly-leaf thus:

> HYPATIA: or, the History of a most Beautiful, most Virtuous, most Learned and every way Accomplished Lady, who was torn to Pieces by the Clergy of Alexandria to gratify the Pride, Emulation and Cruelty of their Archbishop, commonly but undeservedly stiled ST. CYRIL.

Which plainly indicates the author's view on ecclesiastical hypocrisy, even if we did not read his further comments in due course:

> How insufferable a burlesquing of God and Man is it to revere so ambitious, so turbulent, so perfidious and so cruel a Man as a Saint! But in good Earnest this same title of Saint has not seldom been most wretchedly conferred!

H. P. Blavatsky, a century later, concurred heartily. "A saint butchered," she says, "a butcher sainted." But between her illuminating comments in *Isis Unveiled* and John Toland's ingenuous but fervent little "history" we may place the hard facts as given in the *Encyclopaedia Britannica*; namely, that Hypatia was the daughter of Theon the mathematician; that she occupied the chair of Platonic philosophy at Alexan-

dria in the early years of the fifth century A.D.; that she lectured on Plato, Aristotle, and other philosophers, but that all her written works, which were chiefly mathematical and astronomical commentaries, are lost.

> Such information as is available suggests she was the embodiment of Alexandrian Neo-Platonism, which was more scholarly and less given to metaphysical elaboration and less intransigently pagan than the Athenian school.

The account of her death is given briefly — not that the horror of it is lessened — and then, having provided the usual dry, succinct article, the writer disposes of Cyril (and of a great deal more than Cyril), in a manner that John Toland would have highly approved:

> Cyril's style of writing is as objectionable as his character and spirit. Yet he takes high rank as a dogmatic theologian, and those who seek precise and rigid definitions of orthodox belief conjoined with tenacity of conviction find him indispensable.

Verb. sap.!

So much for the *Encyclopaedia Britannica*. Now to return to our little gem — which cost but sixpence when published!

> I am going to give a short Account [begins Toland] but as full as ancient Books afford us Material for the Life and Death of HYPATIA, who will ever continue the Glory of her own Sex, and the Disgrace of ours.

Far from seeking to play down that disgrace, men, he says, should be ashamed

> that any could be found among them so brutal and so savage in disposition ... A Bishop, a Patriarch, nay, a Saint [he can never let the "Saint" slip by unnoticed, and rightly] was the Contriver of so horrid a Deed, and his Clergy the Executioners of his implacable Fury.

He then describes the fame of the Alexandrian School and of the Alexandrian Library, which "reached much further than the name of Alexander himself," and points out what a proof it was of "the incomparable Hypatia's" rare gifts, that "at a time when men of immense Learning abounded," she, a woman, and so young a woman, should be elected to the chair of Platonic philosophy, and that there should be "a Confluence to her from all parts of those who make Philosophy their Delight or Study."

Great must have been the reward of these students, for Toland quotes Suidas (one of the authorities he draws upon) as saying that she

> explained *all* the Philosophers, that is, all the several Sects, with the particular tenets of their Founders, which shows an inexpressible Elevation and

> Capacity, each of these separately being thought a sufficient Province to exercise the Diligence of any one Man consummate in Letters.

Small wonder that Hypatia "soon had a crowded Auditory," for in addition to such "Elevation and Capacity" she had great loveliness and eloquence, and it was but natural that "the Alexandrian School never flourished more" than when "the Blessing of her divine Voice" was in its classrooms. Toland seems to revel in his vision of "the Flower of all the Youth in Europe, Asia and Africa sitting at the feet of this most beautiful Lady," but he is careful to add that, though "never Woman was more caressed by the Public, yet never Woman had a more unspotted Character."

Inevitably, some of her students fell in love with her, and even through Toland's brief account of one such instance we sense the poor boy's immaturity and simple honest lust, and Hypatia's poise and Platonic idealism. She is said to have been married to the philosopher Isidorus, but, according to Suidas, to have "died a maid," which, observes Toland naïvely, "is not so irreconcilable a Thing as People may be apt to imagine in first Thoughts." He believes, however, that she was only the betrothed of Isidorus, after the death of his first wife. And he ends speculation thus: "Her Character is in no way concerned in this Particular."

But Hypatia was obviously the type of woman to attract the friendship of noble men, especially those of fine sensibility such as "the celebrated Synesius," who became Bishop of Ptolemais. He was a native of Cyrene, a very ancient Greek colony, and Toland quotes his testimony "to the Learning and Virtue of Hypatia, whom he never mentions without profoundest Respect and sometimes in Terms of Affection coming little short of Adoration." They maintained a close correspondence, and Synesius discussed the writing of his books, *Dion* and the mystical *Treatise of Dreams,* with her, seeking her judgement. Probably they drew closest when Synesius was enduring a period of ill health, brought on by his great grief over the deaths of his wife and children. Hypatia, one feels sure, showed both tenderness and wisdom. She must have had warmth of heart or Toland would not have recorded of her that "never was any Professor more admired of the World or more dear to his own Scholars," and though Synesius was one of these — the most distinguished — it could not be for the sake of mental qualities only that he addressed her as "My Mother, my Sister, my Instructress, my Benefactress."

Words fond and earnest outlast time. They still ring true across the centuries. It was in the year A.D. 413 that Synesius wrote wistfully: "My heart yearns for the presence of your divine Spirit." And again, "When I have news of you and learn, so I hope, that you are more fortunate

than myself, I am only half-unhappy." He it was who called Hypatia's voice a "blessing." We may be sure it never faded from his memory. And thinking how long these two have both been dust and ashes, it is touching to find Synesius beginning a letter with two lines from Homer, changing only a word:

> Tho' 'mong the Dead profound Oblivion reigns,
> E'en there my dear Hypatia I'll remember.

Hypatia had another and a far more fateful friend among the great men of the day, Orestes, the Governor of Alexandria, with whom Cyril, the Bishop and Patriarch, was at enmity. Cyril, for that matter, already hated Hypatia too. Toland quotes Suidas' description of him as full of envy

> caused by her extraordinary Wisdom and Skill in Astronomy ... For Cyril was a mighty Pretender to Letters and one of those who will not acknowledge nor bear the superiority of Laymen in this Respect.

Still less, of course, a lay*woman*! One can well imagine the venom of the haughty, intolerant, less-gifted cleric towards the brilliant girl-Platonist, so universally admired. And pretensions to "Letters" did not content Cyril; he was given to dabbling in civil matters and also enjoyed persecuting Christians who "differed somewhat from him in discipline, though not in doctrine." "But," says Toland — Toland seems to have had a mighty keen eye and sharp tongue for the little failings of Mother Church —

> they must be mere Novices in Ecclesiastical History who know not that Discipline has ever been reckoned of greater consequence than Doctrine, if one may judge by the commotions that have happened in the Churches or the Durations of these Schisms.

It was highly displeasing to Cyril that Orestes should seek Hypatia's advice "in Matters difficult or dangerous," as Orestes had begun to do frequently — indeed it was this that led to the intimacy between them. Foremost among these matters was Cyril's edict of expulsion of all the Jews from Alexandria, which "much grieved" Orestes, who, like the good Governor he was, promptly wrote an account of it to the Emperor Theodosius at Rome. At this point Toland quotes another authority, whom he calls "honest Socrates" and "an unsuspected[1] witness," in that, though an ecclesiastical historian, this same Socrates did not tamper with the facts of the events that followed. The first of these was an attack made upon Orestes in his chariot by certain monks; when his guards deserted him in fear, the people ran to defend their Governor and seized the monk

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[1] Presumably meaning "unimpeachable."

who had thrown the first stone, which struck Orestes on the head. He was put to torture and died. Cyril's rage was unbounded. Orestes had escaped; so Hypatia at least must be sacrificed "to the Prelate's Pride and the Ghost of Amnonius" (the monk). "Wherefore," continues Toland, "certain hot-brained men, headed by one Peter the Lecturer, entered into a Conspiracy against her" and seized her when she was returning home in her chariot.

Her brutal murder followed. She was pounded to jelly under Peter's club, her body cut to pieces and the flesh scraped from the bones, then cast into the fire by Cyril's order. Cyril was later accused and found guilty of having sold the gold and silver ornaments from her chariot and spent the money. Thus, says H.P.B., "one of the first Christian saints appears in the pages of history as a murderer and a thief."

It was only to be expected that such a woman as H.P.B. should admire and honour such a woman as Hypatia. Both were teachers of Ancient Wisdom, bearing aloft the torch of Truth; both were assailed by the bitter enmity of those whose interest it was to deny it — the one, even to the point of suffering martyrdom. All praise to John Toland for his simple, moving little book, for the trouble he obviously took in gathering the material for it and marshalling his authorities so carefully,[2] and above all for his frank, manly, honest admiration and tender pity for the hapless Hypatia — "Hypatia, whose Memory will ever last" — which redounds the more to his credit as he lived in the somewhat arid Age of Reason, the first half of the eighteenth century, when few English writers showed the slightest interest in Neo-Platonism and the older Mysteries associated with it.

But, naturally, H.P.B. looked deeper into Hypatia's life and death, with greater understanding of "the glorious maiden-philosopher," and the reasons she gives for her cruel end are more complex; we find them in *Isis Unveiled,* Volume II, Chapter VI. We learn that Hypatia was considered dangerous because she shed a bright Platonic light on what was going on at the beginning of the fourth century; namely, the formation of the new, i.e., the Christian, religion, which was borrowing freely from the older faiths and even from pagan mythology.

If the connection between new and old could be exposed, says H.P.B.,

> with such a coincidence of astronomical allegories of various Pagan myths with the dates adopted by Christianity for the Nativity, Crucifixion, and resurrection, and such an identity of rites and ceremonies, what would have been the fate of the new religion had not the Church, under the pre-

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[2] They are Synesius, Socrates the ecclesiastical historian, and Philos, contemporaries of Hypatia; Suidas later, and various others.

text of serving Christ, got rid of the too-well-informed philosophers?

And to these philosophers Hypatia's friendship and influence with Orestes the Governor gave protection and security. Moreover, by expounding the doctrines of Plato and Plotinus, she was impeding Christian proselytism, and — perhaps worst — having studied under Plutarch and learned the secrets of theurgy, she could divulge the *natural* causes of *divine* miracles.

So "the young, the learned, and the innocent Hypatia" had to die, lest the Platonic light she was transmitting "began shining so inconveniently bright upon the pious patchwork as to allow everyone to see whence the 'revealed' doctrines were derived." Had not the ancient creeds been speedily obliterated, it would have been found impossible to present the Christian religion as a New Dispensation, a direct revelation.

Reverting to the article in the *Encyclopaedia Britannica,* we find a particularly significant sentence in regard to that most notable of Hypatia's pupils, Synesius, whose affectionate and admiring letters are indeed the main source of information about her personality.

> This close friendship between the pagan Neo-Platonic teacher and the Christian Neo-Platonic pupil illustrates one aspect of the complex relationship between Christian Church and pagan philosophers of Alexandria under the Christian Roman Empire, the close and fruitful contact, so important for later developments.

Close it certainly was, fruitful it might have been, and "later developments," ah! how different! The hope of one universal *theosophia* handed down from and by the Masters was trembling in the balance. But bigotry triumphed. With the death of Hypatia the Neo-Platonists lost their strongest friend, and to continue their school at Alexandria was impossible. Its dispersal, long desired, was achieved. Yet, for many centuries, a curious ghost still walked. St. Catherine of Alexandria ranked throughout the Middle Ages as one of the most helpful saints in Heaven. But little or nothing is known of her definitely and it is thought her story may really be that of Hypatia.

Such is the tragic tale, shot through with beauty, which, in the words of good John Toland (a Neo-Platonist himself, of a later day — who knows? — one at any rate, who, like Synesius and Orestes, offered his homage and affection to Hypatia, "Virtue's and Learning's Spotless Star") "I here give you, Reader, tho' it should cost you the Tribute of more Tears to her Memory."

JOAN N. BURNETT

SYED VAHIDUDDIN

Ghalib: The Restless Soul

[Dr. Syed Vahiduddin, Professor and Head of the Department of Philosophy, University of Delhi, is well known to our readers for his scholarly articles on philosophical topics. This month, however, he writes with no less intimate knowledge of Ghalib, whose centenary became a centre of attention recently. Dr. Vahiduddin shows appreciation of Ghalib as a poet, sympathetic understanding of Ghalib as a man, and a penetrating discernment of the philosophical implications of Ghalib's poetic expression.—ED.]

THE IMPACT OF GHALIB'S POETRY was not felt immediately. It provoked a decisively hostile reaction. No wonder the poet felt himself an alien at home, a stranger whose mode of communication no-one could understand, an unwanted intruder in the literary world of his times. The reason is not far to seek. The lure of his Urdu poetry does not lie in its compliance with accepted standards and norms but in its deliberate defiance of what is held sacrosanct by conventional critics and in its open challenge to the traditional criteria of appreciation.

Ghalib's verses are creative achievements and their beauty impinges on our aesthetic consciousness with a suddenness which takes us all unaware. Maybe we find ourselves lost in an unfamiliar world which is nevertheless informed with an exotic beauty; maybe we are thrilled with a sudden revelation of a new dimension in our familiar experiences. Words have a familiar ring but they are used with a new intention and evoke unexpected associations, big with surprising potentialities. They are significant in what they do not say as in what they do say. It is not the ambiguity of the words but the ambiguity of the situation which the words convey that is truly fascinating. His words, like those of all great poets, are as significant in retrospective reflection as in their immediate impact.

It is clear from his letters and the account of his biographers that he was not himself fully aware of his achievement in his native tongue. It was late that the worth of his Urdu poetry dawned upon him and he realized that in contrast to the achievements of the great masters like Mir and Sauda his poetry was a novel experiment bound to force admiration and recognition in times to come. But mostly he staked his reputation on his Persian poetry and considered his Urdu "colourless," even a "disgrace." The judgement of time has completely reversed his own and that of his contemporaries, and it is only on the basis of his meagre output in Urdu that his claim to a place in world-literature rests. Ghalib's Persian poems do not lack lusture and some of them, like those he wrote on being con-

fined to jail on the charge of gambling, are deeply moving and unforgettable. But taken as a whole his Persian poetry cannot vie with that of the great masters of Iran and has no relevance for world literature. If he is robbed of his Persian poetry his greatness is unaffected; if he is deprived of Urdu poetry he becomes only a passing phenomenon of literary history. His Urdu poetry is an enduring part of Indo-Muslim culture and will continue to wield a powerful influence on the aesthetic consciousness of the Indian subcontinent, quite irrespective of historical divisions, regional conflicts, and political alignments. It is in Urdu poetry that Ghalib's lyrical genius finds its most beautiful expression.

In both his letters and poetry in Urdu Ghalib achieved something which is inimitable and remains unsurpassed in the history of Urdu literature. But it goes without saying that Ghalib's achievement in prose cannot be judged by the same criteria. In all great poetry and indeed in all great art, the artist rises above himself. Poetry is self-transcendence. If the poet cannot rise above himself, as in satires and panegyrics, his art loses its autonomy. It cannot remain disinterested because the poet is involved in his own interests and is ego-centred. Of course the poet is involved and pre-eminently involved in his person but his involvement itself is tantamount to transcendence. If it is love of which the poet sings, it is on the one hand a unique experience which is his own and at the same time a phenomenon in which he transcends all its accidental affiliation and gives expression to an experience which speaks to one and all as a joy for ever. Ghalib's lament on the death of the young boy Arif, whom he had adopted, and on his anonymous beloved are moving expressions of deeply personal involvements. But they become for us transpersonal in their artistic quality. We do not ask who the boy was or who the woman was whose parting in death he lamented, but share in an experience which is ours and yet not ours. His letters tell a different story. They betray the man Ghalib in the varied shades of his life and reflect not only his own conflicts and tensions but the stresses of an era, with a more egocentric accent. They are human documents of undisputed value. But his poetry is greater than the man. It is a vehicle of experiences which might come to us as disclosures of new dimensions of life or of experiences which though familiar to us have never been expressed in such an unexpected association of words.

Ghalib's poetry recounts some of the salient features of man, his perpetual encounter with love, death, and God. Love is a persistent challenge; death, a possibility which is empirically necessary; and God, the all-elusive unknown. Love's mystic relationship with death is nowhere shown more emphatically than in the exquisite verses which F. Rückert

translated most successfully into German and which Hegel quoted in his *Encyclopedia of Philosophical Sciences*. Rumi wonders why man stands aghast before love and death which really bring life to him. He knows that in his confrontation with love and death he stands at the cross-roads. He cannot retain any more what he has of his old self and will have to part with all that he has called his. Man sees only the sinister appearance of love and death and not the emancipation which it is their mission to bring.

Ghalib's consciousness of death has many accents and shows different shifts. Man wakes up in a world which is charged with death. Hence the moment man is able to take stock of his life the fear of death begins to haunt him. But death provokes a conflict in life. Life is sore with sorrows and man is compelled to seek in death a way of escape. Death becomes the last hope of an anguished soul and what can speak more eloquently of man's state of despondence than his dependence on death as the last hope? But to get rid of sorrows at the expense of life makes death a costly bargain. The inevitability of death makes life all the more valuable and precious. It gives a new dimension to the joy of life. And besides there is the suspicion that death might not be after all a real end but only an apparent termination. Ghalib responds to the prospect of a posthumous existence, sometimes in a lighter and sometimes in a more serious vein. What is the heavenly garden of the pious but a nosegay in the niche of oblivion with persons who are absorbed in ecstasy? This does not mean that he denies the prospect of another life but only that the poet is not interested in any higher or lower variations of life's context. The celestial garden is after all a garden, though perhaps with a different "climate"! But how does Ghalib respond to love? He knows that love means a parting with vain aspirations and in a *ghazal* of exquisite beauty he longs to pass through the pangs of love again and to be lost again in the contemplation of love. This retrospective reflection makes him yearn for a new vision and encounter. Ghalib's experience of love moves in different dimensions. In its traditional phases it is jealous and exclusive. It is the desire to possess and be possessed by the one we love, to have an exclusive relationship with the one. This passion for exclusiveness may be the primitive desire to hold the other exclusively or the metaphysical urge to seek through the other an expansion or wholeness. At the highest moment of success it can defeat its own end and the poet is jealous of himself in the moment of his supreme joy.

Ghalib's love has some characteristic expressions. It is either projected into the future or related to the past. In lyrical poetry an appeal to memory plays a significant role. "Sad memory brings the light of

other days" and the present becomes meaningful to the poet only in so far as it is related to the past. It is the past which makes the present momentous. The poet bewails the days and the years that are gone for good. The anguish of the past is recalled with new anguish and the poet realizes that the passion has survived youth and that youth cannot be brought back.

Life is perpetual suffering and its process is irreversible. Indeed to be is to suffer. If one is not fortunate enough to suffer in love one shall suffer on another account. Modern philosophical musings are anticipated with a surprising twist. I exist so far as I suffer. Suffering is the existential *élan* of my life. Existence begins in dread and with dread. It is care-ridden through and through, passes through regrets for what is done and is even more tortured with regrets for what is missed and left undone. But suffering is not evil in itself; it is rather the necessary condition of man's spiritual fulfilment and realization. It is bound up with aspiration. The more we aspire the more we suffer. A drop of water could not become a tear in a human eye if it were content with the condition in which it found itself and did not aspire to a higher station. One gets only what one aspires to.

Though, with Ghalib, life is ridden with sorrow and projected towards death it is love that imparts value to life and enables man to enjoy life in a unique way. The sorrow of love knows no cure and yet cures all other sorrows and moral ailments. The only other poet who has sung of love in immortal strains in Urdu is Mir Taqi Mir. Mir's poetry has unbelievably tender overtones. His love is death-conscious in a peculiar way. No doubt the futility of all that is earthly and the never-ceasing awareness of the transience of life is characteristic of much of Persian poetry. The experience of love is here dovtailed with the awareness of death in a characteristic way. The quatrains of Omar Khayyam sing of love with death in the foreground. But in Mir love is completely subdued and overwhelmed. Nothing avails and with a sense of unmitigated frustration the poet drags on his weary way to death as an inevitable end. Love is a protracted sigh and heaven has no stars to guide the lover on his futile journey. Mir leaves tears as his memory and legacy. Though for Mir the bud smiles only to signal its death his consciousness of the transience of life is, surprisingly enough, tempered by the metaphysical vision of death as an interval to give respite to the wayfarer on his onward march. It is an interval and by no means a finish.

Ghalib's poetry strikes a different note. There is something heroic about it. His surrender in love is seldom passive. He wants to maintain his dignity, is loth to take the initiative, and at the same time realizes

that love cannot be reconciled with pride, as it demands the sacrifice of all that can be called one's own. His love is even indifferent to success. Even when it recedes into memory it illumines the present and imparts a new meaning to life. But love to him is essentially a continuous waiting in the form of wistful yearning. Love demands patience and the span of life given to man is so short that even if one had lived longer one could have only prolonged the period of waiting. Yet, only when one suffers in love can one know what the joy of life really means. Suffering and joy go together in love.

Ghalib's poetic consciousness is indeed shot through with a metaphysical vision of reality. Reality is one and the diversity is only apparent, an illusion created by the ascription of reality to "imaginary idols." But this realization does not come to the poet immediately. He passes through different stages of knowledge. The poet is at first bewildered by the manifold of appearance. The bewitching charm of lovely ones and the beauty of the world in all its variegated hues make the poet ask God to enlighten him as to what to make of this colourful pageant if nothing but He exists. But soon he begins to know that even the self as an alienated ego is not real but a veil that covers reality, an almost insuperable obstacle in the way. Man as the real self has a different dimension. Man's descent on earth has been his doom, his fall. If he had not appeared he would have been one with the unmanifest reality. When nothing had come into being God existed and if nothing had ever come into being God would have existed all the same. Hence the poet bewails his being on earth as tantamount to alienation, to metaphysical privation. If he had not come into being he would have been what he was before he came into being! Humanity is the loss of divinity.

But though he might regret his existence he is aware that the metaphysical alienation is not final, and does not affect man's greatness. Man's metaphysical roots naturally make him discontented for ever. An *inquietude puissante,* a mighty restlessness, drives him higher and higher and his aspiration has no limits. The world given and the world hidden are not adequate to quench man's thirst for the infinite. But reality cannot manifest itself in its transcendental purity. To manifest is to manifest through material conditions, through gross patterns and moulds. God as supreme reality is pure transcendence. Tillich has called God the symbol of God. He is not far from the perspective of Ghalib, who considers the object of worship only a pointer which beckons beyond itself. Even what is seemingly given as immediate in perception is really the ultimate which is supremely beyond. Ours is the condition of the dreamer who has wakened himself in a dream. True to the great Sufi

tradition which found its climax in the teaching of Ibn Arabi, he considers manifestation itself to be a veil. The conditions which make manifestation possible make the subject of manifestation unapproachable. We are so much lost in the glamour of appearance that we cannot go beyond.

Ghalib's apprehension of the divine mystery in all its transcendental inaccessibility makes him all the more cognizant of the supreme distinction of man. No station assigned to man, however exalted it might be, can really meet man's urge for the infinite. Hence an agonizing restlessness drives the poet to look beyond and ever beyond, to aspire higher and higher. Man's yearning refuses to be bound by the idea of an end and Ghalib wonders what man's next step will be, beyond the realm of possibilities. This might be the reason why Iqbal counted him among the ever restless souls who preferred to wander through the spheres rather than dwell in a perpetual abode of bliss.

Ghalib's poetry bears eloquent testimony to the perplexing paradox of the human situation. The poet who aspires to the highest easily succumbs to the pull of earthly ambitions. His restlessness is sometimes the expression of the annoyance caused by worldly frustration and privations; at other times it is born of a discontent with all earthly fulfilments. It is the same poet who finds the wound that can be cured worthy of contempt and who yet cannot resist the human urge to find relief through tears and complaints. With all his delight in the finite and the fleeting he thirsts for the infinite and with all his engrossing concern for the values of life he is constantly aware of his metaphysical roots. Indeed Ghalib's poetry is a fascinating reflection of divided consciousness, of worldly involvement and of dissatisfaction with every factual achievement.

SYED VAHIDUDDIN

In Circles

Events are not linear.
They circle around us
as the centre of gravity.
We attract what we are.
We attract what we think.
We attract what we do.

DANIEL SIMPKINS

New Books and Old

A Fine Contribution to *Gita* Scholarship*

AMONG Indian works of philosophical and religious importance none enjoys the unique position that the *Bhagavad-Gītā* holds. From the moment of its "birth" it has ascended the pinnacle of such literature in this continent and has been studied and commented upon, translated and analysed, in every possible language having literary ambitions. As indicated by Zaehner himself, English and other Continental languages are no exception in this matter, and there are quite a large number of English translations and critical studies of the *Gītā*. Zaehner therefore pertinently raises the question: "What then is the justification of the present work?"

An answer to this question is provided by Professor Zaehner and bears repetition here:

> Hill, Edgerton, and Lamotte, on the other hand, were primarily interested in what the Gita actually said, not in what others said it said or what they said it had in pristine times *not* said. This is very much my approach too; but I have tried to go a little further. It was once fashionable to emphasize the various strands that go to make up the Gita as we now have it, and to classify them as Samkhya, Vedanta, or Bhakti as the case might be, thereby emphasizing the apparent incoherence of the poem. It therefore seemed to me that the only sound way of tackling the Gita might be "by putting as little as possible of oneself into it ... to consider it as a whole that should be explained by itself and by the *milieu* out of which it grows," to interpret from the parallel passages within itself and from similar passages to be found in the Upanishads which the author of the Gita certainly knew. Further, the didactic portions of India's Great Epic, the *Mahabharata* (though probably all of them are later than the Gita) can sometimes be usefully adduced in clarification of its thought.
>
> It was only after teaching the Gita for a number of years that it appeared to me, with each re-reading, to be a far more unitary work than most modern scholars had been prepared to concede; and it was this realization that impelled me to write an edition of my own.

Further on Zaehner says:

> In "interpreting" the Gita, as in interpreting any sacred text (or indeed any text) the danger is that the interpreter will quote all that is grist to his mill while failing to draw attention to what embarrasses him in other parts of the text. The only complete answer to this is to produce an accurate translation, leaving it to the reader to interpret the book as best he can. This, however, is easier said than done for two reasons. First, many of the keywords of the Gita are so ambivalent in meaning as to make such an "accurate" translation impossible without either misrepresenting the original or failing to bring out the multiplicity of meaning these keywords may contain in any single instance. Secondly, most recent translations of the Gita (particularly the more popular ones) have not been accurate at all, and by being both inaccurate and theologically biased, a very false view of what the Gita actually says has been passed off on an unsuspecting public. ... This being so, it seemed to be best to present the Gita in three forms.

In consequence, Zaehner offers firstly what seems to him an accurate and readable translation of the *Gītā* without the apparatus of notes. "This is intended for such as wish to read it through in its 'raw' state without being reminded the whole time of the interconnexions between the parts or the origin of the various doctrines it propounds."

Secondly Zaehner presents the same text accompanied by the Sanskrit

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**The Bhagavad-Gītā: With a Commentary Based on the Original Sources.* By R. C. ZAEHNER. (Oxford: Clarendon Press; Oxford University Press, London. xii+480 pp. 1969. 88s.)

original in transliteration and very full notes, and this forms the bulk of the book. The bulk of the commentary is drawn from the *Gītā* itself, from the Upaniṣads, and other relative texts like the *Sāṁkhya-kārikā,* the *Yoga-sūtras* and the doctrinal portions of the *Mahābhārata.* As a result it seems to show a coherence within the general frame of Hindu thinking that has not always been obvious before.

Since transitions from one topic to another are often disconcertingly abrupt, in spite of the essential unity of the *Gītā,* in the third section or Appendix, Zaehner has brought together the main topics dealt with. This will enable the critics to spot the contradictions (if any) right away. In addition, the grouping of cognate texts together in the Appendix is designed to bring out the *Gītā*'s teachings on the main subjects of which it treats.

In the excellent Introduction Zaehner deals with such topics as the *Gītā* in context, its philosophical background, and, mainly, the teachings of the *Gītā,* occupying almost thirty-two pages of close print. The translation or first part (pp. 43–109) is followed by the translation accompanied by the Sanskrit text in transliteration and very full notes (pp. 111–403) and Appendix (405–64). Finally there are two useful Indexes: of Passages Cited and General.

The principles enunciated by Zaehner are unexceptionable in the case of any text in general, but the question still persists in the case of a sacred text which has become one of the principal sources of both religion and philosophy and a "way of life" as to interpretations which have been traditionally handed down. One might agree with Zaehner that the polemics which have been used by commentators who wished to establish a particular school of thought to the exclusion of others should warn us of the inadequacy of these for a real or "original" understanding of the text. In IV. 34, "Learn to know this by humble reverence (of the wise), by questioning, by service, (for) the wise who see things as they really are will teach you wisdom," the *Gītā* itself indicates how this faculty of "seeing things as they really are" can be acquired. Presumably, therefore, we may conceive of a continuous tradition which may be only partially reflected in the older commentaries, but which is living, and through which this wisdom can be acquired. If the *Gītā* is teaching a "way of life" as God intended us to live, to be instruments in His hands and to carry out His grand design, and if the *tattvadarśins* are available from whom one can acquire this imperishable wisdom, then our efforts, however brave or learned, must fall short of the ideals which we have before us. The arguments adduced by Zaehner are adequate if only a verbal approach is made to the principles expounded in the *Gītā* and not an attempt at practical realization of the truth as characterized by the expression *tattvadarśin.* That the *Gītā* is one of those rare sacred texts which have been commented upon by so many different scholars representing different viewpoints and experiences is only a measure of its universality, attesting to varieties of religious experience. The *Gītā* is not a theory of life but a book of life itself.

Even so, when with our unaided efforts and intellects we approach a study of such a text, the method indicated by Zaehner is the only scientific approach which will meet with approval in critical circles as a piece of scholarship. That the *Gītā* itself can be made to reveal its doctrines by judicious juxtaposition of similar thoughts in its different sections and by studying the inherent contradictions in full, without recourse to other external agencies, is an ideal worth achieving, and Zaehner has very much realized his ideal in this work. Among the many translations and interpretations of the *Gītā,* Zaehner's best represents what is sound in modern critical scholarship, both on its lower textual-critical level as well as on its higher level of comparative study of similar situations within the text itself.

The English rendering is readable, mostly accurate, and the notes are helpful in understanding difficult passages. It is a distinct contribution to modern scholarship centring on the *Gītā*. The Oxford University Press has printed it with its usual care, and the few misprints such as "Dhristiketu" (p. 113, verse 5) can easily be corrected by comparing the text printed earlier as "Dhrishtaketu" (on p. 45). Zaehner's work on the *Gītā* deserves a prominent place in the library of those who value the *Gītā* as the source-book of spiritual enlightenment.

S. M. KATRE

Birthright of Man: A Selection of Texts prepared under the direction of JEANNE HERSCH. (UNESCO, Paris. 592 pp. 1969. Illustrations and Plates, 7 in colour. $12.00; 60*s*.; 35*F*.)

At the instigation of the General Conference of UNESCO, an impressive anthology under the title *Birthright of Man* has been published to mark the twentieth anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

This anthology (which is also published in French) comprises over a thousand quotations drawn from a wide variety of traditions and periods, which, with their profound concordance enhanced by the very diversity of their origins, illustrates how human beings everywhere, throughout the ages and throughout the world, have asserted and claimed the birthright of man.

The material for this anthology has been supplied to the Secretariat by the Commissions of the Member States, the international non-governmental organizations regularly associated with UNESCO's work and a number of specialists, as well as many friends who gave their voluntary co-operation. The result is some five hundred pages of quotations, over thirty pages of bibliography, and in addition a number of illustrations, including some in colour. Although many different people have collaborated in its production, credit is above all due to Jeanne Hersch, Director of the Division of Philosophy; for it was she who conceived the idea of the work and planned its arrangement.

It is stated in the preface that the book is not meant to be read straight through nor is it intended for systematic study; rather it is suggested that the reader should open it at random and meditate upon a few lines or pages. One cannot help feeling, however, that its price and size might deter many readers from purchasing it for such a purpose. Rather it would seem that it should occupy a place on the shelves of libraries so as to be accessible to writers, platform speakers etc., who should find it invaluable both as an inspiration and as a book of reference.

Besides extracts from various Declarations, Acts, Charters, etc., quotations from writers such as Herder, Voltaire, Montaigne in the West are also adduced, and writings from India, South America and China — to name only a very few — are included.

Two brief quotations may help to give an idea of the quality of this noble book:

> All men are as one before God: Tatars and Germans and other peoples ... If a man be endowed like us with reason, he is spiritually our brother or child.
>
> THEODOSIUS KOSOJ
>
> (A Russian serf who became a monk and was condemned for heresy in 1554.)

> Consider your origin: ye were not formed to live like brutes, but to follow virtue and knowledge.
>
> DANTE (1265–1321): *The Divine Comedy*

H. M. LISHMAN

SAYANA's *Subhāṣitasudhānidhi*. Critically edited with an Introduction by K. KRISHNAMOORTHY. (Karnatak University, Dharwar. xxii+249+xlii pp. 1968. Rs. 10.00)

Till a little over a decade ago the earliest anthology of Sanskrit poetry was the fragment published by F. W. Thomas under the title *Kavīndravacanasamuccaya* from a twelfth-century Nepalese MS. It was in 1957, when the *Subhāṣitaratnakośa* of Vidyākara (*c.* A.D. 1130) was published (Harvard Oriental Series, No. 42, edited by Kosambi and Gokhale), that the world of Sanskritists could identify the two. The opening verse of this anthology, which runs:

nānākavīndravacanāni manoharāṇi
saṁkhyāvatāṁ paramakaṇṭhavibhūṣaṇāni
ākampakānī śirasaśca mahākavīnām
teṣāṁ samuccayam anargham ahaṁ
vidhāsye

gives also the theme of this class of works. It is the merit of the anthologies that, being themselves late, they have preserved for our edification some of the finest lines of our lyric and gnomic poets which would otherwise have been lost for ever.

Nearly two centuries later comes the *Subhāṣitasudhānidhi* of Sāyaṇa. Mentioned in histories of Sanskrit literature, the present anthology has been known by name to Sanskritists for at least half a century. A few decades ago the present reviewer had occasion to examine the MSS. of this work in the Madras Libraries. The credit of bringing out the first edition of the anthology goes, however, to Dr. Krishnamoorthy.

The book is divided into four sections (*Parvas*) named after the four highest human objectives in life (*puruṣārtha*): virtue (*Dharma*), wealth (*Artha*), pleasure (*Kāma*), and liberation (*Mokṣa*). The editor is right in feeling that this is perhaps the earliest anthology to bring some of the very elegant verses from our early *Kāvyas* and *Śāstras*, poets and philosophers, under these well-known sections. Among the ancient poets and philosophers whose verses are included here may be mentioned Abhinavagupta, Bhāmaha, Kālidāsa, Kṣemendra, Līlāśuka (also called Bilvamaṅgala), Mayūra, Rājaśekhara, Kumārilabhaṭṭa, and Jayantabhaṭṭa. Nor are our epics and didactic literature neglected as source-books. We thus find here many fine verses from the *Rāmāyaṇa*, the *Mahābhārata*, *Arthaśāstra*, *Kāmandaka*, and the *Pañcatantra*. Among the *Dharmaśāstra* texts used here are Manu and Yājñavalkya.

The Introduction, which gives the life and work of Sāyaṇa, fixes the date of this work to the period A.D. 1346–55. Regarding the *bhāṣyas* on the Vedas there is evidence to believe that Sāyaṇa had hired some paṇḍits to write them on his behalf. It is not unlikely that this anthology too was actually compiled by some paṇḍit for the edification of Sāyaṇa. There is an Index of the first words of verses at the end.

The editor and the Karnatak University are to be congratulated on this welcome addition to our collection of Sanskrit anthologies.

H. G. NARAHARI

Jaina Culture. By MOHAN LAL MEHTA. (P. V. Research Institute, Jainashram, Hindu University, Varanasi. 152 pp. 1969. Rs. 10.00)

In this book Shri Mehta ably presents in brief the various aspects of Jaina culture comprehensively and objectively. Like his former works, *Outlines of Jaina Philosophy* (reviewed in THE ARYAN PATH, June 1955) and *Jaina Psychology* (reviewed in THE ARYAN PATH, January 1958) the author puts before us in a lucid and universally acceptable norm the topic of the struggle between the only two eternal elements, the *Jiva*, soul, life, or *atmā*, and the *Ajiva*, matter, body, or *pudgal*, and the way to attain the supreme bliss by perfectly developing the soul to its highest degree, hence liberation from all foreign

karmic attachments.

The author has treated the subject systematically. He describes the antiquity of the subject-matter and gives a chronology of the personalities and the historical periods involved, giving a clear, authentic historical perspective of Jaina cultural development. Important chapters present Jaina literature and arts and architecture. A general idea is given about the canonical Jaina texts and scriptures and other subsequent works. This shows the vastness and depth of the Jaina literature and the immensity of the philosophical subjects treated. The description of arts and architecture shows the various modes in which pictorial, sculptural, or architectural representation of Jaina culture flowered over several centuries.

The Jaina theory of reality is extensively treated. This is covered in the six elements, namely, soul, matter, medium of motion, that of rest, space, and time. The universe consists of these six elements, which carry on the beginningless and endless cycles of life, of worldly animation and extinction.

The soul is connected with mind, mainly in human existence, and the mind must be developed fully to reach the stage of omniscience, which is the goal. This brings us to the consideration of the stages of mental and spiritual development, the last stage whereof coincides with Liberation, which implies that the soul has got rid of all the *karmic* matter which has clung to it since times immemorial. The *Karma* theory and its understanding is an important step in the proper grasp of Jaina culture. *Karma,* its connection, influx, containment, expulsion, and ultimate neutralization — this process is the main plank and pillar of the Jaina philosophy and it is well developed in the chapter on Liberation.

The theory of non-absolutism — *Syādvāda* — is described. The states of existence of beings are depicted. The soul is immortal. Owing to *Karma,* it moves in states of infernal, animal, human, or celestial beings. If freed from these bonds, it acquires *Mokṣa, Paramātmā, Nirvāṇa,* Salvation, full of bliss and freed of all unhappiness.

The way of life to reach the Goal is delineated. The way for a layman — *Aṇuvrata* — and the way for an ascetic — *Mahāvrata,* are shown in detail in the concluding chapter.

Thus the author shows us in a short treatise the important features of Jaina culture. Like his prior works, the book, owing to its lucid style and presentation, is bound to be popular among students of philosophy and psychology.

S. K. JHAVERI

Chao Lun: The Treatises of Seng-chao. A Translation with Introduction, Notes, and Appendices by WALTER LIEBENTHAL. (Hong Kong University Press; Oxford University Press, Bombay. 152 pp. Second, revised ed., 1968. HK $50)

The first edition of this book came out just a few days before the Communist army besieged Peking. Most of the copies sent out to Europe and other countries were either lost or confiscated; and under these circumstances a re-issue was long overdue. But it was not easy to find a publisher for a highly academic and technical work of this type, until finally the University of Hong Kong was willing to take the risk of publication, and the result is the present volume. The translator is Dr. Walter Liebenthal, Lecturer in Sanskrit and German at the University of Peking during the pre-Communist period. He was Visiting Professor of Sino-Indian studies in the Visva-Bharati University at Santiniketan and now lives in retirement at Tübingen-Lustnau in Germany.

The volume under review makes very difficult reading and demands concentrated study and a familiarity with Chinese language and idiom which very few people possess outside academic circles. It is therefore difficult to convey

the true significance of the teaching of Seng-chao. He does not speak in well-defined terms but in pictures that fade into each other. He borrows his language not only from Lao-Tzu and Chuang-Tzu but also from the Buddhist Sūtras; and his main efforts were directed to proving that Pragna (*Prajñā*) was merely another name for the Sage who is one with Nature, the Tao conceived as a person, the *Dharma* conceived as Wisdom and grace. The Sage is the personification of the Bodhisattva who out of mercy forsakes his *Nirvāṇa* in order to convert needy and deluded beings. The translator himself admits that if we understand the book as a merely philosophical endeavour, it evaporates into thin air and nothing remains but verbal and insipid argument. The reader must therefore enter into an intuitive understanding of the mystical experience of Seng-chao, which according to him cannot be conveyed in words.

This work appears to have been the main scripture of the first period of Chinese Buddhism, which covers roughly the years between A.D. 300 and 700. Later Dhyāna-Buddhism absorbed all other interests and emerged as the dominant faith purged of all traces of its Indian origin.

B. V. NARAYANA REDDY

Zoroaster's Influence on Anaxagoras, the Greek Tragedians and Socrates. By RUHI MUHSEN AFNAN. (Philosophical Library, New York. 161 pp. 1969. $5.00)

Dr. Ruhi Muhsen Afnan has already established his reputation as a serious and painstaking student of Zoroastrian and Greek philosophical thought in his previous book, *Zoroaster's Influence on Greek Thought*. In his latest book he quotes copiously from Zoroastrian and Greek sources to elaborate the theme of his previous book. In the concluding chapter of this book Dr. Afnan says:

> ... with Aspasia and Anaxagoras, who had obtained illumination from Medism or Zoroastrianism, a procession of illustrious individuals in the field of philosophy, literature, art and music, entered Athens or were born and reared there. These were the ones who brought about that period of Enlightenment, generally associated wth the Periclean Age.

This statement underscores the theme of the book.

According to the author Zoroaster was a Messenger of God who propagated to man the Will of God as revealed to him. The Greek philosophers and poets, who were highly influenced by Zoroastrian spiritual thought, understood and explained the rational basis of this thought. They declared that the basis of the Zoroastrian spiritual thought was reason and reason itself was an emanation of the Good Mind, which was the most resplendent aspect of the Almighty Creator of the Universe. The principles of Truth, Justice, Purity, and Good Will, which Zoroastrianism inculcated and which bring beauty and harmony in the minds of men and in the entire universe, are not only the commandments of God but can also be seen through the eye of reason.

To illustrate his thesis that he who claims to represent Divine Dominion should adequately reflect His perfections, the author refers to Cyrus the Great and says that he was the "anointed," because his first preoccupation and admitted duty was to fulfil Ahura Mazda's purpose in the world and reveal his Good Thought and Justice and Law and Order among peoples and nations.

Referring to the stay of Themistocles, the great Greek soldier-statesman, at the court of King Xerxes, the author says that

> before accepting Themistocles as a permanent companion in his Court, Xerxes gives him one year to decide, and appoints a Magus to provide him all necessary information as to the beliefs of Zoroastrianism. It was thus a deliberate rational and free conversion to Zoroastrianism.

This conduct on the part of Xerxes is in complete accord with the teachings

of the Prophet himself in the *Gathas*.

The book will be found interesting and illuminating by the students of Zoroastrian and Greek philosophic thought.

PHIROZE J. SHROFF

What DID Jesus Teach? By A. GORDON JONES. (Deholm House Press, Nutfield, Redhill, Surrey. 128 pp. 1969. Paperback. 10*s*.)

Christians and non-Christians alike continue to be baffled by, or find enigmatic, many of the sayings of Jesus of Nazareth. On the surface, many apparent contradictions are to be found within the Gospel narratives. Yet someone whose teachings were manifestly inconsistent would never have gained such a following: so why do the contradictions arise, and how are they to be resolved? A. Gordon Jones's *What DID Jesus Teach?* argues that, apart from cases where knowledge of the Biblical text is incomplete, contradictions arise usually because the sayings of Jesus on particular subjects are not seen as a whole. Arguing that it is more important to understand how Jesus *thought*, rather than what he said, the author examines a range of doctrinal and ethical issues — the Fatherhood of God, death, forgiveness, the nature of truth, violence, sex, materialism, and suffering — in a very worth-while attempt to point out the main lines of Jesus' thinking. This is a short book, and makes no claim to be more than an introduction to a very difficult issue, but it is certainly a very worth-while introduction, not sacrificing profundity by its brevity.

BRIAN G. COOPER

A Layman's Quest. By SIR MALCOLM KNOX. (Muirhead Library of Philosophy. George Allen and Unwin Ltd., London; Humanities Press Inc., New York. 187 pp. 1969. £2.00)

This is a second volume based on Gifford Lectures delivered by the one-time Principal of the University of St. Andrews. In the first volume, *Action*, Sir Malcolm was on his own ground as a former professor of Moral Philosophy. Here he trespasses (to use his own word) on the ground of theologians and historians in his quest for what it is reasonable to believe.

He begins by stating a case, and a good one, for the reasonableness of having a religious belief and closes by drawing some of the implications of that belief which he has come to find reasonable, discussing in particular the paradox of transcendence and immanence. He holds that the attempt to combine the two is also an attempt to follow the religion of Jesus.

This raises the problem of the Christian appeal to historical events as the basis of religion, a problem which occupies the central part of the volume and provides, to the mind of this reviewer, its significant contribution. In the seven chapters Sir Malcolm reviews the more important ways in which, during the past two centuries, the historical problem has been raised, evaded, and answered. He begins with Reimarus, whose great merit was to raise the historical questions and to approach them with historical imagination, thus challenging the historicity of the Christian religion. He, with Strauss a century later, still poses the questions which must be answered by all who are prepared to *think* about Christ. Kant is included, briefly and in a limited context, mainly because of his impact on Hegel. The very full treatment of the latter is necessary because of the profound effect he had on the thinking of the nineteenth century, most of the problems of which he had grasped by 1800. The modern period from Strauss and "modernism" through Schweitzer to Bultmann and the "Form critics" is

*

dealt with at some speed, partly perhaps because of the fuller treatment available in Bishop Neill's *The Interpretation of the New Testament 1861–1961*. Yet the reader could wish for a fuller treatment by this author, especially in view of his attitude to the recent developments which have subordinated historicity to proclamation.

He argues very persuasively that there is need to look again at the distinction drawn by Lessing between the religion of Jesus and Christianity. It is in the teaching of Jesus that Sir Malcolm finds the elements of a reasonable faith.

There is much in this book which will win the enthusiastic support of those concerned with the new quest of the historical Jesus. Yet it has to be said that the answers to many questions tend to require the rejection of other answers no less arguable. Sir Malcolm agrees that the result of his selective evidence has a negative element. Yet the overall impression is largely positive as must always be the case when a man acknowledges the authority of Jesus "which we recognize as truth when we encounter it, harmonizing and explaining the higher realm of our experience."

Sir Malcolm apologizes in advance for being an amateur in the areas where much of his argument must move. Then God send us more amateurs!

MARCUS WARD

Belief. The Gifford Lectures delivered at the University of Aberdeen in 1960. By H. H. PRICE. (Muirhead Library of Philosophy. George Allen and Unwin Ltd., London; Humanities Press, New York. 495 pp. 1969. 75*s*.)

With modesty and the faintest sadness, the retired Wykeham Professor of Logic in the University of Oxford says that here, in his latest volume — he is the author of *Perception* (1932), *Hume's Theory of the External World* (1940), and *Thinking and Experience* (1953) — "all he can do is to flit slowly in the winter twilight just above the hedgerows, searching carefully for very small field-mice which may or may not be there." But, of course, in these twenty-four chapters on belief Professor Price has subjected to a prolonged, balanced, penetrating, and what must surely remain a classical, examination the important psychological, philosophical, and religious aspects of the question.

He certainly does much more than to show that the dispositional analysis of belief is on the whole more acceptable than the occurrence analysis, notwithstanding that "the difference between the traditional occurrence analysis of belief and the modern dispositional analysis is indeed one of the main themes of these lectures." What is not the least impressive is his readiness to grant that for both practical and theoretical purposes we need to believe more than we can hope to know — "reasonable belief is a second best; but still it is very much better than nothing, though knowledge would be better still if only we could have it" — and that for the religious satisfaction without which we cannot hope to be satisfied completely (and here Professor Price quotes St. Augustine's *Cor nostrum inquietum est donec requescat in Te*) we might be wise to attempt, by appropriate devotional practices, to awaken in ourselves the theistic beliefs we still resist consciously. The procedure is difficult to carry out; but though difficult, it is not in principle impracticable.

(Here Professor Price might have recalled Pascal: "You would like to attain faith, and do not know the way ... Learn of those who have been bound like you ... Follow the way by which they began; by acting as if they believed, taking the holy water, having masses said, etc." — *Pensées*, Everyman edition, p. 68.)

The author agrees with Locke as against Cardinal Newman that belief can have degrees, but he vividly illustrates the importance of Newman's dis-

tinction between Real and Notional Assent. Sometimes his discussion might seem disproportionate, as perhaps in his chapters on "Self-verifying Beliefs" and "Belief 'in' and Belief 'that.'" But to some of his readers his treatment of moral beliefs will be nothing less than vexatious. For as against his acceptance of "an attitudinarian theory," according to which "the statement 'there are persons who have more moral insight than I have' is equivalent to 'there are persons whose moral attitude to some action (or some person) I tend to share, when I learn what their attitude is, and in respect of what characteristic of that action (or person) they have it, though I did not have that attitude previously,'" it may be objected that many people did, and probably still do, share the intrinsic approvals and disapprovals of a Nero and a Hitler. Nor should we forget the agonies of our human world which have come not least from beliefs which, for all that they were "real," were still mistaken. Perhaps, after all, attitudes and beliefs alike are no satisfactory substitute for knowledge. But certainly Professor Price gives us here a grand contribution to our search for knowledge concerning belief.

M. KAYE

The Rose-Garden Game: The Symbolic Background to the European Prayer-Beads. By EITHNE WILKINS. (Victor Gollancz Ltd., London. 239 pp. 16 Colour Plates, 28 Monochrome. 1969. 63*s.* i.e. £3.15)

Many readers of this valuable study will be surprised by some of Miss Eithne Wilkins's findings concerning the nature, history and meaning of the rosary. Christians, for instance, tend to think that it "belongs" to them, but will find that it has belonged for much longer to older religions, while even within Christianity its origins in the Paternoster and the Marian Psalter remain more or less obscure: the name "rosary" seems first to have been used in its modern sense as late as 1475. But as the book's (perhaps not altogether happy) title makes clear, the rosary regarded simply as those beads which are "told" by the religious is only one aspect of the multifarious lore concerning the *rosarium* which Miss Wilkins has brought together here.

What makes her book particularly valuable is its examination of the esoteric and mystical meanings of the many symbols it discusses; her imaginative and interpretative insights are often profoundly revealing. But we are bound to say that she sometimes loses them in a fog of erudition. Here and there her pages become so overcrowded with material and with her deductions from it that (as in the case of the chapter on the rosary in European art) her thesis disappears in the catalogue of her examples and in the proliferation of her footnotes. Nor is one always quite at ease with her interpretations. Was the child-god Horus (or his Christian counterpart, the Christ-child), when represented with finger to lips, specifically enjoining silence regarding the mysteries, as Miss Wilkins suggests, or was he representing in himself that Silence which is in Heaven? And since when did *accidie* mean merely "depression"?

But it is ungenerous to find faults in a book which has so few, and is for the most part as exciting as it is scholariy. It is, too, most handsomely produced, and its profuse illustrations are as stimulating as they are well chosen.

R. H. WARD

In This House of Brede. By RUMER GODDEN. (Macmillan and Company Ltd., London. 424 pp. 1969. 38*s.* i.e. £1.90)

Miss Godden's living anatomy of a House of enclosed nuns gives two popular fallacies the lie: that a novel about women must be a lame, one-sided

affair; and that nuns are so sheltered from the wide world's troubles as to provide no scope for a novel at all. Miss Godden knows her territory and its potentialities inside out; few readers will escape being entangled, almost painfully, in the drama and suspense of it. Brede Abbey, a fine building and estate-land near England's southern coast, is an example or prototype of a Benedictine community keeping strict vows, mainly silent, punctuating the day with the Divine Offices sung by the choir from dawn to nightfall. When a novice has consented to take her final vows she is bound for life.

This is the framework. Within it are personalities diverse and clashing, temptations, tensions, pride, and jealousies — enough to tear these abnormally sensitive natures almost into shreds. All are seen in action, bursting through the diurnal routine built on a peace and tranquillity rarely attainable in practice. Stresses and crises beset everyone, from the newly-elected Abbess and her senior Dames to the newest postulant. These spiritual dramas do seem, for better or worse, to be intensified by an induced concentration on perfection and default. From Miss Godden's sea-swell of continuing narrative, crisis after crisis surges to its breaking; always calmed, but after a deep struggle, or by something viewable as miracle or coincidence. Nor is the "world" absent; music, sculpture, literature provide creative links, and one of the major problems of this poverty-pledged monastery involves large-scale finance.

In time we know the characters and offices of each several nun, her background and its influence, her own especial struggles within the community life. If one among the many can be called "heroine" of the tale, it is Philippa Talbot, who left a life of brilliant administrative success to obey an urge that often faltered, as a succession of sacrifices was required during some fifteen years of personal discipline. The book is a chronicle of those years. Long though it is, I found it breathlessly enthralling; sensational perhaps, but with a firm and purposeful grip that allows no single thread to go astray. It is a great performance.

SYLVA NORMAN

Ancient Theocracy. By V. K. MATHEW. (Logos Publications, Bombay. 371 pp. 1969. Rs. 42.00)

For his study of theocracy, Dr. Mathew has chosen an unusual field, an extremely old period of human history. It begins with the fourth millennium B.C. in Egypt and round about Mesopotamia.

As is well known, a history worth the name of the period and the region is not available. Any study is likely to be only partial, because of the scanty material and because of the gaps unbridged by any tradition.

Varied material is used for writing these fragmentary records. Experts have been able to decipher a good deal; yet much more remains to be known. Under such conditions to venture to study theocracy, to scan the relations between the divinities, the human beings, and others, mutually and severally, must at best be considered a bold attempt. The material is not adequate to warrant such an intensive study.

In nine chapters, the author has tried to express his findings, on the basis of whatever material he could find. His study of twenty-seven illustrations, the Glossary of gods and divinities, and the Chronology show that he has spared no pains in gathering material. From the Bibliography, however, it seems that he got neither the most important nor the latest books. He does not even mention the year of publication of the books he has listed. Dr. Mathew has drawn heavily on H. Frankfort's *Ancient Egyptian Religion,* which was published in 1948. Because the latest books were not available to him, Dr. Mathew's chronology and his findings seem outdated.

A rudimentary knowledge of Sanskrit

and of Hindu mythology would have made a vast difference in his conclusions. In such a study of ancient history or proto-history, it is necessary to know the Hindu Purāṇic legends, from the eighteen main, if not also from the eighteen subsidiary, Purāṇas. Those accounts may have been of kings and heroes in other parts of the earth. It is not impossible to find a relation between the Egyptian and Assyrian kings and some of those mentioned in the Purāṇas. Hindu mythology too may have parallels in Egyptian and other mythologies about which records are being studied.

Dr. Mathew, however, seems poorly equipped for a comparative study of the Hindu and other mythologies. In the epilogue, he has equated Shiva with Satyanārāyaṇa and Daridra-Nārāyaṇa! (p. 339).

The printing of such a volume needed to be faultless. It is exactly the opposite! The Index is an indication of the utter carelessness with which the entire book has been handled by the press. We regret the necessity of, but cannot avoid, this harsh judgement.

S. R. TIKEKAR

The International Centre of Education at the Sri Aurobindo Ashram. (The Centre, Pondicherry. 1968. 210 pp. Rs. 5.00)

This Centre of Education celebrated its silver jubilee in December 1968. Apropos of this happy occasion, *Mother India* (a monthly review of culture) brought out a special number dealing with the history, aims, activities, and aspirations of the Centre, together with a selection of extracts from the writings of Śri-Aurobindo and the Mother on "The Necessity of a Spiritual change in Society and the Way of the Integral Yoga," "Vital Problems of Education," etc. All these diverse contributions have been since separately published in book form under the present title. The object of the particular system of education, known as Free Progress System, is

> the development of all the aspects and capacities of the personality under the sovereign direction of the inner guiding principle of growth, the true soul and spirit. In this system the methods of education that are being experimented in, permit the free growth and progress of each individual student on the lines of his inner law of development. (p. 1)

All those deeply interested in education of the right type will find ample inspirational ideas in this publication.

G. M.

Delhi: A Political Study: By JAG PARVESH CHANDRA. (Metropolitan Book Company, Delhi. 135 pp. 1969. Rs. 15.00)

Over the years the problem of an appropriate administrative set-up for Delhi, which would reconcile its status as the national capital with the demand of powerful vocal sections of its population for Statehood, with all its appurtenances of a Legislature, a Ministry and so on, has been constantly debated. Delhi is a Union Territory but is different from other Union Territories because it is the seat of the Union Government, and as Shri M. C. Setalvad, the noted jurist, pointed out before the Administrative Reforms Commission, it would be unusual to have a Legislature at the capital where Parliament functions.

The Administrative Reforms Commission, after careful consideration, has recommended what it calls "a working statehood" for Delhi, with the existing Metropolitan Council transformed in practice into a "working Assembly," and the Executive Council functioning as a policy-making and policy-executing body. It has also recommended the abolition of the Delhi Municipal Corporation and the other local authorities operating its transport and electricity

services, water supply, and drainage, and their conversion into statutory autonomous corporations, thus obviating the multiplicity of bodies operating under the Delhi Administration or within its territorial limits.

In this book Shri Jag Parvesh Chandra examines the administrative set-up of Delhi in a historical perspective and analyses in detail the existing set-up and the changes proposed by the Administrative Reforms Commission. He supports, with some minor modifications, the latter's recommendations. One significant point, according to him, is that the Union Government in the Ministry of Home Affairs and Parliament as the supreme law-making body should, by convention, ensure that they limit their responsibility to subjects reserved to the Centre. The most important need is, however, to vest the Metropolitan Council, which is at present merely an advisory body, and the Executive Council, a body which assists the Administrator, with a real and effective part in formulating and executing policy.

There have been cases, one very recent, wherein considerable confusion was created by statements by responsible persons, including the Union Home Minister, as to who is responsible for law and order and connected matters in the Delhi and New Delhi municipal limits. It is such overlapping and confusion that any future administrative set-up should avoid.

What Shri Parvesh Chandra's book underlines is the urgent need to arrive at firm decisions about the final set-up for India's capital taking into account all aspects of the problem.

C. V. H. RAO

Correspondence

Towards Human Maturity

London, 20 November 1969

THE 1969 ANNUAL BRITISH CONFERENCE of the Teilhard de Chardin Association drew to London devotees of the seer's thought from all over the United Kingdom and many from the European continent too, while a number of Asians in Britain also attended, adding their contribution to the wide-ranging discussion from Hindu or Muslim tradition. The conference theme — "Towards Human Maturity: Personal and Collective" — was examined by speakers known both for erudition and a concern for humanity, and the discussions more than ever before revealed the appeal of Teilhard's thinking and the inspiration of his vision, across theological and national divisions.

John Davy, a leading British science journalist, awarded the O.B.E. for his work in the responsible popularization of scientific questions, analysed the current relationship between human nature and the biosphere. The choice was between exploitation and participation. Unless mankind replaced its contemporary exploitation of the environment by co-operation with nature, modern civilization literally had "no future." Technological development was using up the earth's resources at an unprecedented rate: if consumption of fuel, minerals, water, and fertile soil continued as at present, resources would near exhaustion by A.D. 2000. The planet was accumulating an unbearable load of waste: Britain alone was putting five million tons of dust into the atmosphere each year, and the total throughout the world was now begin-

ning to reduce the amount of solar radiation reaching the earth. Unprecedented climatic conditions could result: already jet flight was altering traditional cloud and wind movements. Mr. Davy was not over-optimistic that mankind would adequately face this challenge: "there is no evidence that our assumptions about technology are changing fast enough to deal with these problems."

Man had failed to steward his given resources in a proper consciousness of his divine commission, but rather had invested science and technology with his own violence and power-fantasies. There was a "crazy irrationalism" about so many uses of modern science, geared to materialism and selfishness. The Western world could learn much from the Orient, especially from the Gandhian principle of "enough-ness": self-sufficiency for all in harmony and human co-operation, rather than a competitive maximization of wealth, was the only answer. Gandhi's emphases on the capacity to work as wealth, rather than a commodity to be bought and sold, and on the holding of personal possessions in stewardship for society rather than any absolute right to possess and use them selfishly, also had considerable contemporary relevance for a threatened Western civilization, undermined by its own thoughtless misuse of men and nature. In the face of all this, Mr. Davy contended, the only grounds for optimism were the increasing "valuing of each individual, the rising sensitivity to tyranny, especially among the young, and the beginning of a new feeling for things." Man had to rediscover his sense of wonder towards nature.

Changing values in Western society was also a preoccupation of another major contributor, Professor G. M. Carstairs of Edinburgh, President of the World Federation for Mental Health. On the theme "Towards a Healthy Community," he argued for the erosion of competitive attitudes by co-operative values:

> Among the implicit repercussions of the tidal wave of technological advance is the fact that our traditional values, which served society well during the industrial era, may be disastrously inappropriate in a neo-industrial society, which could well transform our material surroundings and our interpersonal experiences before this century reaches its close. The values which may prove most "adaptive" for life in neo-industrial society are not those of rugged individualism, stoicism, competitiveness and toughmindedness; instead, they are likely to be interdependence, the fulfilment of each individual's personal potentialities, and a fostering of the capacity for experiencing joy.

Christianity's relation to the development of "mature manhood" was critically examined by the Rev. Dr. Anthony Dyson, Principal of Ripon Hall, Oxford. The practice of institutional Christianity had often fallen disastrously short of its proclaimed beliefs and intentions. Even today there remained the danger that institutional religion could be a prop for human immaturity, rather than a stimulant to maturity. Yet Christianity had an important contribution to make towards human maturity, not in competition with other religions so much as side by side with them.

> Certain themes from the Judaeo-Christian tradition about man are of seminal importance for our understanding both of the nature of human potential and of the modes of its realization. These insights include, for example, the Judaeo-Christian understandings of community, the sacramental signs and enactments concerning human relations, the general understanding of history implicit in that tradition, and the capacity for the identification and critique of "idols." Teilhard's understanding and development of such themes, set against the background of an evolutionary world-view, provides us with a framework in which the growth into maturity, individual and collective, seen both anthropologically and theologically, is firmly and integrally set. In this scheme positive human values are recognized in their own right, but also given a wider reference as part of the over-all divine-human pilgrimage towards completeness. The

theme of mature manhood can therefore at the level of our common human concerns be summarized in the words "building the earth."

Dr. Dyson affirmed that Christianity comprised a belief in purpose and goal in history highly relevant to that pilgrimage into maturity, and declared that Christianity had to preoccupy itself with the future rather than with the past.

With this dimension of the future, Christianity would not just be for the Church, but "a faith on behalf of human faith."

The Teilhard conference proved itself an invaluable forum of truth on the central theme of the contemporary quest for higher human maturity.

BRIAN G. COOPER

Ends and Sayings

" . . . ends of verse
And sayings of philosophers."

—SAMUEL BUTLER: *Hudibras*

Mr. Anthony Wedgwood Benn, British Minister of Technology, in speaking at a Press Gallery lunch, is reported by Ian Aitkins (*The Guardian,* 20 November 1969) as saying that government is being transformed from an overriding authoritarian power to "government by consent." He claimed that, of the power formerly vested in the Ministries and in Parliament, perhaps only one third remained, the other two thirds being taken over respectively by international bodies and by the ordinary people, collectively and individually. Incidentally, we might mention as a classic example of "people power" their successful revolt against the arbitrary government decision to construct a third massive London Airport at the village of Stanstead, Essex, in fertile agricultural land. Other pressure groups, consumer and civic associations, welfare organizations etc., have also achieved a measure of success in the face of government opposition and apathy.

Mr. Benn suggested that today the real function of the politician might be rather in leadership, "a very different thing from the exercise of authority." Members of Parliament and Ministers had to consider so many issues and differing viewpoints, to give direction to the various arguments and discussions as to the ways that present powers, so widely distributed, can best be used for common good. There was a definite place for Parliament as a forum, a place for "talking" (the original meaning of the word), but for talking *to* the people rather than *about* them.

This makes greater demands on the abilities and discrimination of the "leaders" as also on intelligent cooperation by the people themselves, if the method is not to degenerate into mere "talk" and anarchy. In this distribution of power, with many more decision-makers. "Ideas," "Values," "Principles," become increasingly important, if there is to be a balance between individual freedom and the rights of the community. Yet the reconciling ideas and principles are found only partially (and therefore dangerously) in any sectarian religion, speculative philosophy, or political ideology. Only the wisdom which synthesizes and is at the heart of them all can help. On such a basis, the gradual abdication of authoritarianism, which seems foreshadowed in the present changes, could bring in a happier age of greater self-responsibility and understanding—if the fierce blind forces that make for the mob *Terreur* can be controlled.

Geoffrey Moorhouse, in writing (*The Guardian,* 20 November 1969) about Professor Thomas Torrance, of Edinburgh University, who has recently won a thousand-pound prize for the most distinguished religious book of the past couple of years, *Theological Science* (Oxford University Press), describes how the Professor was led to bring out into the open his own long-pondered questions, such as how "that which is not observable can come within the scientist's apparatus for observation." His arguments are that "reality" always outruns our experience of it, and that reason is the tool shared by theologian and scientist alike. Professor Torrance believes that, in view of the new world-concepts given by space exploration, theology and science will ultimately come together. The Aristotelian cosmic picture, carried on by later scientists and philosophers, was that of an enclosed system, and this has limited scientific understanding just as much as the mental models made of Christ have hampered Christianity.

But, as the Professor sees it, the more mankind is able to reason about observed data from the moon, and eventually from the rest of the universe, "the greater the need to posit a transcendental rationality to account for it all." For him the mistake made by the recent Christian theologians in their endeavours to approach natural science is that they, too, have taken over the already outdated Aristotelian concept of the universe as a "container," and thus have, one must suppose him to mean, lost the idea of transcendence. Incidentally, in Hindu philosophy, the containing "Egg of Brahmā," the manifested universe, comes and goes within the boundless plane, beyond which is the ever-transcendent absolute Reality.

It is interesting to compare this with the conclusions of Sir Malcolm Knox, Principal of the University of St. Andrews, Scotland, for thirteen years. In his book *A Layman's Quest* (reviewed elsewhere in this issue) he ends by outlining "the implications of the belief which he has come to find reasonable":

> The history of man, and of the individual, is the process of self-transcendence, the gradual rise of man from natural beginnings [to self-consciousness and] to a consciousness of a spiritual destiny ...
>
> A difficulty arises because we tend to emphasize our individuality, our separation from one another, for separation is finitude ... space is a way of thinking necessarily associated with objects; it is something which the mind thinks, not something in which mind is. The truth of the plurality of men is their unity, though not uniformity, in God. The spirit is one, transcendent and immanent, absolute and finite. ...
>
> In art, in religion, in thoughtful investigation, it is when we are, as we say, "taken out of ourselves" that our experience is most real and most valued. This is the advance beyond individuality to that in which individuality is grounded. ...
>
> The ground cannot itself be merely a personality, or even an infinite personality, for that is a contradiction in terms. To speak of a personal God is to use a metaphor, though one which we cannot evade.

Sir Malcolm has drawn on various sources (including Aristotle's *Metaphysics*) in his endeavour to clarify something of the mysterious unity of transcendence and immanence, which means for him, at the same time, "an attempt to follow the religion of Jesus."

The air of Scotland seems conducive to provocative and illuminating ideas.

Mention was made in "Ends and Sayings" (August 1966) of the fine work being done by "Promoters of Animal Welfare" (P.A.W.) in disseminating information about alternative techniques for the use of laboratory animals for experimentation. The organizers originally planned to campaign for various aspects of animal welfare, and have, indeed, leaflets available on other "animal welfare" topics also; but this particular field has developed so actively over a wide international field (with translations in many languages), and so suc-

cessfully, that for the time being they are having to concentrate all their energies and funds on it. The original title, P.A.W., is thus in abeyance, and their new "Fund for the Replacement of Animals in Medical Experiments" (FRAME) — a Registered Charity Trust — is being promoted to the full.

FRAME is not a research institute, but its purpose is to focus attention on, and spread information about, the research work done along the lines of alternative techniques. A couple of points may be of interest, taken from letters sent to Heads of Medical and other Faculties at Universities, Research Institutes, etc., in Japan and in some European countries respectively.

> Replacements for animals stem from two main sources — tissue cultures and computers. If all the available tissue culture techniques were used more widely in the initial stages of screening drugs and in vaccine manufacture, the lives of many millions of animals could be spared. Improvements in the design and programming of computers are also leading to their greater use in basic research, such as in the simulation of physiological processes and biochemical reactions. With the use of these mathematical models it is now possible to simulate live animal experiments and produce more quantitative (numerically measurable) results than can be obtained on live animals.
>
> ... we have obtained evidence of even more advanced techniques in the use of computers for replacing animals in such fields as drug testing and crash studies. Another very important report that has come to our notice describes the use of the Gas Chromatograph for detecting, with complete safety, traces of, and the course of, drugs in humans, thus obviating the need for animal studies.

One might perhaps still hesitate over the use of oestrogens, of tissue, cell, and organ culture, since researchers are as yet only on the fringe of understanding all the nature of these, but it is a big step away, morally, from the cruelties connected with the vivisection of the living animal.

FRAME's publicity literature has none of the woolly sentimentality sometimes associated with animal defenders but, as befits the character, and the many scientific qualifications, of the founder of P.A.W., Dr. C. E. Foister, presents its scientific and medical evidence with a serious and authoritative voice. Two leaflets, *Fund for the Replacement of Animals in Medical Experiments,* and the more detailed and technical *Is the Laboratory Animal Obsolete?* (now revised and enlarged) are issued by FRAME, 35 Wood Road, London s.w.20, England.

Statement about ownership and other particulars about the magazine "THE ARYAN PATH" to be published in the first issue every year after the last day of February

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FORM IV

(See Rule 8)

1.	Place of Publication :	1 B. P. Wadia Road Bangalore 4 (India) South India
2.	Periodicity of its publication :	Monthly
3.	Printer's Name : Nationality : Address :	M. S. Srinivasa Murthy Indian 281/D, 10th Main, Fifth Block Jayanagar, Bangalore 11
4.	Publisher's Name : Nationality : Address :	M. S. Srinivasa Murthy Indian 281/D, 10th Main, Fifth Block Jayanagar, Bangalore 11 *Simultaneously published by* : K. R. Achuta Rao "Theosophy Hall" 40 New Marine Lines, Bombay 20 BR
5.	Editor's Name : Nationality : Address :	Sophia Wadia Indian "Theosophy Hall" 40 New Marine Lines, Bombay 20 BR
6.	Names and addresses of individuals who own the magazine and partners or shareholders holding more than one per cent of the total capital :	Theosophy Co. (India) Private Ltd. 40 New Marine Lines, Bombay 20 BR (A Charitable Company)

I, M. S. Srinivasa Murthy, hereby declare that the particulars given above are true to the best of my knowledge and belief.

(*Sd.*) M. S SRINIVASA MURTHY
Publisher

1st March 1970



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APRIL 1970

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THE ARYAN PATH seeks to light up the Way: it believes there is one for all souls. But it preaches no fixed creed. Sincere and coherent statements of many points of view find place in it, so long as they touch on the great human concerns. The journal seeks to promote, among thoughtful men who are not necessarily specialists or scholars, study and comparison of ideas ancient and modern, Eastern and Western; and of perspectives mystical, philosophical, literary, and social-reformist.

In this way it hopes to draw on the treasuries of learned, thoughtful, gracious minds for the general use and to induce in each reader an alert perception of his own simultaneously with respect for many others. The typical, wished-for reader of THE ARYAN PATH is interested in the things of the mind and in the products of other cultures as well as those of his own.

THE ARYAN PATH has always been maintained by heavy sacrifices, charity funds at the disposal of the promoters having been used to support it as a public service. It has seen forty years of continuous publication.

A subscriber receives in the course of each year 500 Royal Octavo pages or more of substantial writing, for an annual subscription of Rs. 12.00, 18*s*., or $5.00. This barely covers the cost of producing and forwarding the physical copies: the authors' fees and the expenses of the offices are still a net burden. A wider circulation will ease this burden a little, on the one hand, and, on the other, fulfil the journal's hopes and aims. It is hoped that you will become a subscriber and bring THE ARYAN PATH to the notice of such friends as will share its high concerns.

Edited by Sophia Wadia at Theosophy Hall, 40 New Marine Lines, Bombay 20 (BR). Printed and published by M. S. Srinivasa Murthy at W. Q. Judge Press, 1 B. P. Wadia Road, Bangalore 4.
Simultaneously published by K. R. Achutha Rao at Theosophy Hall,
40 New Marine Lines, Bombay 20 (BR)